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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Leotis Brannon Branigh, III, appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, for
first degree murder.
Statement Of The Facts
Desiree Anderson and her ex-husband, Mike Johnston, had two children
together, and were again living with each other the day Mike was murdered, October 1,
2007. (Tr., vol. 1, p.472, Ls.16-23.) In March of 2007, when Desiree was no longer
married, she met Branigh and became intimate with him. (Tr., vol. 1, p.481 , L.8 - p.482,
L.6.) Desiree made two rules clear to Branigh: he was to leave no marks and not tell
anyone they were having sex. (Tr., vol. 1, p.482, L.23 - p.483, L.6.) Although Desiree
was considering reuniting with Mike, she went on a weekend trip to Seattle with
Branigh, and while there, pictures were taken of them during a romantic encounter, with
her consent. (Tr., vol. 1, p.483, L.10 - p.484, L.19.)
Branigh told Mike about the pictures (Tr., vol. 1, p.484, Ls.20-22) and after
Desiree told Branigh in May of 2007 that she was breaking up their relationship, he was
upset (Tr., vol. 1, p.487, Ls.10-20; p.489, Ls.3-8). During their time together, Branigh
and Desiree exchanged text messages hundreds of time, which was a common way
they communicated. (Tr., vol. 1, p.488, Ls.1-7.) After their break-up, Desiree changed
her phone number because Branigh's text messages were creating problems with Mike,
and Branigh wrote her letters until he found out her new phone number and began
texting again. (Tr., vol. 1, p.489, Ls.6-25.)
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Desiree and Branigh began talking again, and she began going out with him and
being intimate until early September of 2007. (Tr., vol. 1, pA90, Ls.2-22.) Branigh
indicated to Desiree that he thought Mike was controlling and physically abusive toward
her, but, according to Desiree, that was not true and she told Branigh that. (Tr., vol. 1,
pA91, L.6 - pA92, L.17; pA93, Ls.20-24.) After Desiree once more told Branigh she
was not going to see him anymore, she moved back into Mike's house. (Tr., vol. 1,
pA93, Ls.18-19.) After the second breakup, Branigh texted her about how she could do
this (i.e., breakup) and she would respond.

(Tr., vol. 1, pA91, L.21 - pA92, LA.)

Branigh and Mike also exchanged phone calls or text messages fairly regularly after
Desiree stopped seeing Branigh. (Tr., vol. 1, pA93, L.25 - pA94, L.6.) According to
Desiree, she had miscarried a pregnancy that summer, and Branigh was upset with her,
suspecting she had done something to cause the miscarriage. (Tr., vol. 1, p.501, L.2 p.502, L.23.) On one occasion in September, when Desiree was leaving a night-time
class, Branigh got into her car and would not get out, at one point threatening to snap
her neck, until police responded to the scene. (Tr., vol. 1, pA95, L.24 - pA97, L.5.)
On October 1, 2007, Mike Johnston went to work, and Desiree slept until about
1:30 p.m., until she was woken up by Branigh pounding on the front door of the house.
(Tr., vol. 1, pA99, L.12 - p.500, L.11.) Desiree called 911 after the knocking continued,
and when a police officer arrived, she had Branigh leave. (Tr., vol. 1, p.500, Ls.2-6.)
When Mike got home that afternoon, he and Desiree drove to the courthouse to pick up
paperwork for a protection order against Branigh. (Tr., vol. 1, p.500, Ls.6-21.) At about
9:00 that evening Desiree returned a movie to a store, and when she returned, Mike
was outside pacing back and forth watching to see if Branigh was going to drive by in
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order to begin establishing that Branigh was stalking them. (Tr., vol. 1, p.504, Ls.3-19.)
Branigh had texted Desiree on September 22, 2007 with a variety of messages
that were demanding, threatening, and showed he intended to get even with her for
having broken up their relationship. (See Sts. ExA.) On October 1, 2007, Branigh sent
text messages to Desiree which reflected a pattern of escalating demands toward her,
threats of harm toward Mike, and other disturbing statements, as the following sampling
shows:
"talk 2 me or this will get bad. aint it fun. u a working woman still" (2:38
p.m.)
"does mk know what u do snitch" (2:43)
"talk to me fact 2 face like the strong woman u r and stop being scared"
(3:32 p.m.)
"im tryn 2 help u and u call cops on me. i love u and cant take this shit
anymore. talk 2 me" (3:35 p.m.)
"I WILL BE FREE" (5:45 p.m.)
"FUK IT THEN COPS OR NO COPS" (6:20 p.m.)
"1M READY 2 DIE" (6:21 p.m.)
"I love u talk 2 me please im trying 2 stay out of trouble" (6:43 p.m.)
"please help me. i can only help so much" (6:57 p.m.)
"im not scared of mk or an of his fam" (7:24 p.m.)
"fuk it im not afraid 2 die" (7:28 p.m.)
"u got ur kids out of there? this is gonna b a mess" (7:55 p.m.)
"my life is yours. if u really want me 2 sacrifice myself and let u have whats
left, then I will. sorry it took so long. i love u my beautiful" (8:39 p.m.)
"i dont care about dead bodies in old graves, ill fight till I win or die" (8:53
p.m.)
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"good bye heart of my heart" (9:02 p.m.)
"mks done u wont talk 2 me, so I swear it on ur kids' lives, mks done"
(9:20 p.m.)
"u don't talk 2 me and I promise u i will take this all the way" (9:23 p.m.)
"all u had 2 do was talk 2 me. c u in a few" (9:34 p.m.)
"Games r what uv always bleevd. Death is an honor. U wont b touched by
this. I WILL BE FREE." (9:36 p.m.)
"c u in a few" (9:37 p.m.)
"all u had 2 do was talk 2 me" (10:09 p.m.)
(St's Ex. 4.)
Branigh also exchanged text messages with Mike on October 1, 2007, up until
shortly before Mike was murdered, as follows:
Johnston: She dont want 2 talk or c u so give it up (8:58 p.m.)
Branigh: bye mikey (8:59 p.m.)
Johnston: I dont control her (8:59 p.m.)
Branigh: bye mikey (9:00 p.m.)
Johnston: Who u with tough guy (9:07 p.m.)
Branigh: me (9:07 p.m.)
Johnston: I dont control her (9:08 p.m.)
Branigh: not anymore (9:09 p.m.)
Branigh: where u at little sister (9:12 p.m.)
Johnston: Home dumbass (9:13 p.m.)
Branigh: hidn behind ur family and the cops still coward (9:14 p.m.)
Branigh: bring urfukn punk ass out of there (9:16 p.m.)
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Branigh: come on with ur stupid ass (9:17 p.m.)
Johnston: Ive been outside 4 almost an hour (9:18 p.m.)
Johnston: I don't depend on the cops (9:19 p.m.)
Branigh: she will (9:20 p.m.)
Johnston: Good 4 u (9:21 p.m.)
Johnston: Ur cool (9:22 p.m.)
Johnston: They might like that (9:23 p.m.)
Branigh: bring ur punk fukn ass out of there u fukn coward (9:23 p.m.)
Branigh: who (9:25 p.m.)
Johnston: My parents (9:27 p.m.)
Branigh: why (9:27 p.m.)
Johnston: Now im done w txt (9:29 p.m.)
Branigh: ur a coward come out of the trailer park. ur kids will never b
harmd by me. (9:31 p.m.)
Johnston: 1m out of there (9:49 p.m.)
Branigh: where (10:10 p.m.)
Branigh: waha (10:10 p.m.)
Johnston: Drive by and see (10:10 p.m.)
Branigh: come on (10:14 p.m.)
Branigh: u know where 2 go coward (10:15 p.m.)
Branigh: u comin (10:17 p.m.)
Branigh: u comin (10:19 p.m.)
(State's Exhibit 60, pp.9-11.) The shooting occurred just after Branigh sent the last text
message to Mike Johnston at 10:19 p.m. on October 1, 2007. (ld., p.11.)
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The district court summarized, in its decision denying Branigh's motion for a new
trial, additional testimony presented at trial which showed Branigh's guilt. The district
court's summary of the evidence, with bracketed references to the record, relates the
ensuing events as follows:
Among the State's witnesses was the woman [Kendra Parker] who lived in
the house at the intersection where the shooting occurred. [Tr., vol. 1,
p.602, Ls.10-19.] The witness testified she had gone outside to retrieve
items from her car trunk, noticed a white car idling at the intersection,
heard a male voice, then heard a gunshot and saw a corresponding flash
of light inside the white car. [Id., p.602, L.23 - p.603, L.17.] As she
crouched on the ground, she heard four to five more gunshots, heard a
male voice say "Oh shit, man", and then watched the white car slowly
drive away. [Id., p.603, Ls.13-22.] When the car drove away, the witness
ran into her house and dialed 911. [Id.] During her testimony, the witness
looked at several pictures of Defendant Branigh's vehicle and identified it
as the same or similar white Camaro she saw idling in the middle of the
intersection when she heard shots fired and saw muzzle [sic] flash inside
the vehicle. [Id., p.610, L.11 - p.611, L.5.]
Another of the State's witnesses was a gentleman [Brian Hodge]
delivering a trailer in the area where the shooting occurred. [Tr., vol. 1,
p.620, L.25 - p.621, L.10.] The witness noticed a white Camaro with its
headlights on sitting off the side of the road ahead of and facing him. [Id.,
p.621, Ls.6-13; p.624, L.22 - p.625, L.14.] Because he was concerned
about what the driver was doing, he slowed down to around 15 miles per
hour. [Id., p.621, Ls.16-21.] He then heard several pops he believed to be
gunshots. [Id.] Immediately after the gunshots stopped, the white Camaro
pulled over into its lane and drove away at a normal rate of speed. [Id.,
p.622, L.21 - p. 623, L.6.] The witness looked around as he drove by but,
when he saw nothing of concern, he continued on and delivered the
trailer. [Id., p.623, L.7 - p.624, L.9.] When he drove back, he saw a
number of emergency vehicles so he stopped and told the police what he
had seen. [Id., p.624, Ls.9-12.] Being a bit of a car buff, the witness said
he noted that the white car was an early 1980's IROC Camaro with a dent
in the driver's right front fender. [Id., p.624, L.17 - p.625, L.14.] After
looking at pictures of the Defendant's Camaro during his testimony at trial,
the witness said the car he saw was either the same car or an identical
car. [Id., p.625, L.15 - p.627, L.15.]
A third State's witness [Doug Bolten] testified he was watching TV
with his wife when he heard one or two gunshots. [Tr., vol. 1, p.631, L.17p.632, L.3.] As he hurried to his window to look outside, he heard four or
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five more shots[11 and saw flashes of light reflecting off a nearby house.
[Id.] He then ran downstairs to his door where he found Michael Johnston
standing on his porch holding his chest. [Id., p.632, Ls.11-13.] Johnston
told the gentleman he had been shot by a man in a white car. [Id., p.632,
Ls.13-15; p.634, Ls.7-8.] The witness told Johnston to lie down on the
porch where it was cooler. [Id., p.635, Ls.5-9.] He then went back into his
house, turned off the porch light in case the shooter returned, locked his
door, and dialed 911. [Id., p.635, L.11 - p.636, L.2.] After talking to the
911 dispatcher, he turned the phone over to his wife and went back out to
his porch to comfort Johnston until the police and ambulance arrived. [Id.,
p.636, Ls.7-18.]
In addition to witnesses that were in the area at the time of the
shooting, the State called two witnesses [Gina Barton and Dawn Gump]
that testified to seeing a white Camaro near the area of the shooting a few
hours prior to the homicide. [Tr., vol. 1, p.590, L.13 - p.591, L.14; p.597,
L.15 - p.599, L.12.] Both witnesses described the vehicle as being driven
erratically or recklessly [id.], both identified a picture of the Defendant's
vehicle as being the same or similar to the vehicle they had seen in the
area [id., p.593, Ls.11-20; p.598, Ls.21-25], with one witness even
identifying Defendant Branigh as the driver of the white Camaro that had
caused her concern on the day of the shooting [id., p.591, L.15 - p.593,
L.5; p.598, Ls.12-20]Yl Finally, the jury was provided with copies of the
heated, and at times ominous, text messages exchanged between phones
belong [sic] to Defendant Branigh, victim Michael Johnston, and Desiree
Anderson Johnston.
Finally, the jury was presented with evidence of a high speed chase
by police as they attempted to take Defendant Branigh into custody that
same night. [Tr., vol. 1, p.694, L.12 - p.696, L.2.] Branigh quickly became
a susRect in the shooting and a description of his vehicle was broadcast to
police. [Id., p.673, Ls.17-23; p.682, Ls.14-19; p.691, L.15 - p.692, L.5.]
The vehicle was soon observed by a police officer in Clarkston,
Washington who attempted to stop Branigh's vehicle. [Id., p.674, Ls.7-13;
p.677, L.24 - p.679, L.21.] However, Branigh drove out of Clarkston and
into Lewiston at a high rate of speed, where Nez Perce County deputies
and Lewiston police officers took up the pursuit of Branigh, which ended
near his parents' home. [Id., p.679, L.22 - p.680, LA; p.696, L.2.] Branigh,

1 Mr. Bolten initially stated that he had "seen three or four more shots[,]" but then
clarified that he had seen flashes of four more shots after the first one or two shots.
(Tr., vol. 1, p.631, L.25 - p.632, L.9.)
Both Gina Barton and Dawn Gump identified Branigh as the driver of the car they had
seen driving erratically earlier in the day. (Tr., vol. 1, p.591, L.15 - p.593, L.5; p.598,
Ls.12-20.)
2
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who resisted officers even after the high speed pursuit had ended, was
eventually taken into custody and placed under arrest for the shooting
death of Michael JohnstonPl [Id., p.697, L.11 - p. 698, L.3; p.699, Ls.1617; p.705, Ls.5-9.]
(Supp. R., pp.478-480.)
Further, when questioned after being taken into custody, Branigh told Lewiston
Police Department Corporal Joedy Mundell that he could not recall being in the area of
the murder (11 th and Cedar Streets) about 10:00 or 11 :00 that evening, but it was
possible that he had been there, and "eluded [sic]" that Desiree was in some kind of
danger as a result of Mike.

(Tr., vol. 1, p.701, Ls.8-21.)

According to Corporal

Mundell's testimony:
[Branigh] stated that he - that he would die for Desiree, he also
stated he would kill for Desiree. When I asked him about the pursuit, he
advised that he had taken off because - basically because the cops had
pissed him off, but told me that he had been stopped in times past and
there had been no problem.
(Tr., vol. 1, p.702, Ls.20-25.)
Ronnie White, a jail inmate at the time Branigh was awaiting trial, testified (as a
defense witness) that he overheard Branigh and Stephen Peak4 (another inmate) in a
conversation during which Branigh said "something about a gun up on the hill" (Tr., vol.
1, p.927, Ls.3-6), and further explained that he had heard Branigh say "something about

Mike Johnston died that evening in the emergency room at St. Joseph's Hospital in
Lewiston from a gunshot wound to the chest. (Tr., vol. 1, p.651, Ls.2-4; p.662, Ls.1821.)
4 Stephen Peak also testified at trial about statements Branigh made to him during their
stay in the Nez Perce County Jail. The admission of those statements was challenged
in Branigh's motion for a new trial based on both the allegation that the prosecutor
withheld potentially eXCUlpatory information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and due to newly discovered evidence of Peak's relationship with Sheriff Dorion
at that time. Inasmuch as the district court found a Brady violation occurred, but found
the violation was immaterial in light of the remaining evidence, Peak's testimony is not
included here.
3
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telling them that there - that there might have been a gun buried on the hill, and that and that after you told them that, then if they were - if they were serious about the case
or something like that, that they would go up there and look and you'd be able to sit
here and see them looking for it or something like that" (id., p.928, Ls.9-16).
Course Of The Proceedings
Branigh was charged by Information with murder in the first degree, felony
eluding, and an enhancement for use of a firearm or deadly weapon during the
commission of the murder.

(R., vol. I, pp.64-66.)

After Branigh's motion to sever

Counts I and II was granted (id., pp.76-77, 147-150), an Amended Information was filed
eliminating the felony eluding charge (id., pp.179-180).
Branigh, through counsel, filed a first motion in limine seeking (in essence)
suppression of Branigh's cell phone records obtained by a search warrant on Sprint
Nextel in Kansas. (R., vol. II, pp.306-307.) That motion was tentatively granted by the
court (id., pp.752-757), but after the state filed a motion for reconsideration based upon
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (et seq.), the Stored Communications Act, the court reversed its ruling
just before trial. (Tr., vol. 1, p.229, L.16 - p.231, L.25; R., vol. IV, pp.752-757.) Branigh
filed a second motion in limine, seeking an order that the state be precluded from
referring to any I.R.E. 404(b) type evidence without prior approval of the court, which
was granted. (R., vol. '", pp.531-532; Tr., vol. 1, p.183, LsA-22.) Branigh also filed a
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, which was denied. (ld., pp.541-542; R.,
vol. IV, pp.752-757.)
On the day of trial, at Branigh's request, he was permitted to represent himself
during the course of trial, with standby counsel. (Tr., vol. 1, pA35, Ls.5-9.) At the end
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of the trial, the jury convicted Branigh of first degree murder and found he used a
firearm during the commission of that crime. (R, vol. V, pp.941-942.) Branigh filed a
motion for a new trial based on a variety of complaints, which was denied. (ld., pp.984988, 1010-1020.) Branigh's motion for reconsideration was also denied. (ld., pp.10341035.) Branigh was sentenced to fixed life for the first degree murder of Mike Johnston,
and 15 years fixed for the firearm enhancement. (ld., pp.1070-1073.) Branigh filed a
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which was denied. (Id., pp.1100-1102, 11091110.) Branigh filed a timely notice of appeal (id" pp.1082-1087), and the state filed a
notice of cross-appeal (id., pp.1 096-1 098), to challenge whether the portion of a victim's
impact letter making a sentencing recommendation had been erroneously stricken by
the court.
Counsel for Branigh filed a "Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative Motion to
Reconsider Previously Denied Motion for New Trial" (R, vol. V, pp.1088-1089.)

His

new motion for a new trial was based on having recently been informed that Stephen
Peak, who testified at trial about statements Branigh made while they were in jail
together, had a much closer relationship with (then) Nez Perce County Sheriff Jim
Dorion than previously known.

His latest motion for a new trial claimed information

about Peak's relationship with Sheriff Dorion entitled him to a new trial because it was
known, and withheld by the prosecutor in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), and (2) was newly discovered evidence entitling him to a new trial under I.C. §
19-2406(7). (Supp. R, pp.197-209.)
After many rounds of discovery requests and filings with the court, on May 24,
2011, over two years after Branigh's judgment of conviction was entered, the court
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commenced an evidentiary hearing 5 on Branigh's newest motion for a new trial (Mot.
Tr., p.24), and subsequently issued an Opinion and Order on Defendant's Motion for
New Trial, denying Branigh's motion. (Supp. R., pp.467-482.) Branigh filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. (ld., pp.483-484, 517-520.)

ISSUES
Branigh's seven issues on appeal are set forth at page 22 of his Appellant's Brief,
and due to their length, will not be repeated here.
The state rephrases the issues as follows: 6
1. Has Branigh failed to establish error in the denial of his suppression motion?
2. Has Branigh failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of
State's Exhibits 32, 33, and 34?
3. Has Branigh failed to show error in the district court's admission of his text messages
into evidence?
4. Has Branigh failed to show fundamental error with respect to his unpreserved claim
of prosecutorial misconduct?
5. Has Branigh failed to establish any basis for concluding the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct under Napue?
6. Has Branigh failed to show that the district court erred in denying his Brady claim?
7. Has Branigh failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for a new trial?

5
6

Branigh was represented by counsel.
The state has elected not to pursue the cross-appeal it filed in this case.
11

ARGUMENT
I.
Branigh Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Prior to trial, Branigh filed a motion in limine seeking "an order barring" the state

from introducing at trial "any evidence gathered from Sprint Nextel Corporation"
concerning his cell phone records. (R., vol. II, pp.306-307.) Branigh argues that the
district court erred in ultimately denying 7 his motion to suppress his cell phone records,
including the content of his text messages, because: (1) based upon I.C.R 41(a), "the
warrant was unlawfully obtained because the magistrate lacked the authority to issue a
warrant for premises outside of the judicial district in which the magistrate resided"; (2)
"the warrant was unlawfully executed because the warrant described the premises to be
searched as being in Texas, and the warrant was served in Kansas"; and (3) the federal
statute (18 U.S.C. § 2703)8 "expanded the magistrate's authority to issue a warrant
outside the State's jurisdiction." (Appellant's Brief, p.26.)
Branigh's' arguments lack merit. First, whether I.C.R 41 (a) authorized the outof-state seizure and resultant search of Branigh's cell phone records is completely
irrelevant to the question of whether there was probable cause to justify such a search
under either the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article 1, § 17

7 After the district court initially granted Branigh's motion to bar the admission of his cell
phone records on the basis of I.C.R 41(a) (Vol. IV, R, pp.752-757), the state filed a
motion for reconsideration, asking to court to reverse its ruling based upon the
Electronic Communication Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (Vol. IV, R.,
rp·763-771).
18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. is the "Electronic Communication Privacy Act" ("ECPA").
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of the Idaho Constitution. 9 Second, the fact that the search warrant incorrectly listed the
premises to be searched as located in Texas instead of Kansas was an obvious error
which was readily recognizable by reference to other information contained in the
search warrant and because the law enforcement officer had knowledge of the correct
location. Third, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 provided Idaho law enforcement officers with a valid
means of executing a search warrant on Branigh's out-of-state cell phone service
provider.

Fourth, although the district court ruled otherwise, because Branigh's text

messages were delivered, like a letter delivered to the addressee, he lost any
reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages and therefore had no standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the search and seizure of those messages.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,302,

Branigh correctly notes that Article 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution is "virtually
identical to the Fourth Amendment, except that 'oath or affirmation' is termed 'affidavit.'"
(Appellant's Brief, p.26 (quoting State v. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628, 630, 130 P.3d 1166,
1168 (Ct. App. 2005).) Branigh does not provide "any cogent reason why our state
constitution should be applied differently" than the federal constitution. State v.
Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130,982 P.2d 961,965 (Ct. App. 1999); see Appellant's Brief,
pp.23-32. Branigh does not cite any textual or structural differences between the
federal and state constitution, list any matters of particular state interest or local
concern, public attitudes, or state traditions that might support an argument for
interpreting Article 1, § 17 differently than the Fourth Amendment. See State v.
Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992) (Bistline, J., concurring).
Therefore, this Court should view the state constitution coextensive with the federal
constitution for the purpose of considering whether the search warrant issued for
Branigh's cell phone records violates constitutional provisions, and conclude that it does
not.
9
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160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). Interpretation of court rules is a question of law reviewed de
novo. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,821,965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998).
C.

Even If I.C.R. 41(a) Was Violated, Suppression Is Not Required
Branigh first contends that because I.C.R. 41(a) "clearly states that the issuing

court must reside within the judicial district where the property or person to be sought is
locatedL]" the "issuing magistrates lacked any authority to issue warrants outside their
judicial districts [and] the warrants were unlawfully obtained." (Appellant's Brief, p.27.)
However, even assuming, arguendo, a violation of I.C.R. 41(a), Branigh is not entitled to
suppression of his cell phone records based upon a violation of a state statute or
criminal rule; such violations do not compel the Fourth Amendment remedy of
exclusion.
"Although exclusion is the proper remedy for some violations of the Fourth
Amendment, there is no exclusionary rule generally applicable to statutory violations."
United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6 th Cir. 2006). Application of the exclusionary
rule is, therefore, "an appropriate sanction for a statutory violation only where the statute
specifically provides for suppression as a remedy or the statutory violation implicates
underlying constitutional rights such as the right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure." Abdi, 463 F.3d at 556; United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251
(11 th Cir.1991) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify application of the
exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or evidence that
Congress intended exclusion as a remedy); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955,
960 (6 th Cir.1990) (holding that government violations of the Electronic Communications
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Privacy Act do not warrant suppression of evidence). The legislature has not provided
for suppression as a remedy for a violation of I.C.R. 41 (a).
Most importantly, a violation of a state law related to an arrest or a search does
not rise to the level of constitutional significance. In Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164,
(2008), police officers stopped a car driven by Moore. The officers arrested Moore for
driving on a suspended license, a misdemeanor.
arrest the officers found crack cocaine.

kL. at

kL. at 166.

In a search incident to that

166-167. Moore moved to suppress the

evidence resulting from the search by claiming that, under Virginia law, the offense for
which he was arrested was only citable, and therefore the arrest was illegal.

kL. at

167-

168. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed Moore's conviction, reasoning that Moore's
arrest was illegal under state law, and therefore the search incident to arrest was invalid
under the Fourth Amendment.

kL. at 168.

After concluding that historical context did not answer this question, the Supreme
Court of the United States first noted that its precedent under the Fourth Amendment
had declared that an arrest based on probable cause was constitutionally reasonable,
and that state law regarding searches and seizures did not change this calculus. 10

kL. at

171-172. The Court noted that attaching a federal remedy to a state law violation would
10 Although Moore involved a challenge to an arrest, it also dealt with the attendant
search incident to that arrest. Moore, 553 U.S. at 177-178. The holding in Moore - that
probable cause determinations under the Fourth Amendment are to be made without
regard to state laws - applies not only to arrests, but to all searches and seizures. See
id., p.171 (as far as the federal Constitution is concerned, "whether state law authorized
the search [is] irrelevant"); p.173, ("our more recent decisions ... have indicated that
when States go above the Fourth Amendment minimum, the Constitution's protections
concerning search and seizure remain the same"); p.176 ("It would be strange to
construe a constitutional provision that did not apply to the States at all when it was
adopted to now restrict state officers more than federal officers, solely because the
States have passed search-and-seizure laws that are the prerogative of independent
sovereigns. ")
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thwart states in setting their own policies by mandating suppression when the state itself
did not. 1.9.:. at 173-174. Basing the constitutional reasonableness of state actions on
state standards would create a vague and unpredictable constitutional standard. 1.9.:. at
174-175. It was also undesirable to have a constitutional standard that would vary from
place to place and time to time. 1.9.:. at 176. "We conclude that warrantless arrests for
crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the
Constitution, and that while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire,
state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment's protections." 1.9.:. Having found
the arrest lawful under the Constitutional standards for arrest, the Court also rejected
the argument that the search incident to arrest was unreasonable because the arrest
was "unlawful" under state law. 1.9.:. at 177-178. See United States v. Green, 178 F.3d
1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 1999) (although police officers executed federal search warrant
outside their jurisdiction, the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United
States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 991 (9 th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that Moore
applies only to state prosecutions, and affirming that Moore applies to arrests and
searches and seizures).
Likewise, in State v. Benefiel, 131 Idaho 226, 953 P.2d 976 (1998), the Idaho
Supreme Court rejected the claim that suppression of evidence is an appropriate
remedy where an officer acts outside the physical boundaries of his jurisdiction but does
not act unconstitutionally. In that case an officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, while
off of the tribal reservation, saw Benefiel driving in a way that gave him reason to
believe he was driving under the influence on an Idaho state highway. 1.9.:. at 227, 953
P.2d at 977.

The officer stopped Benefiel, made contact with him, and, when he
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discovered additional evidence of DUI called in an ISP officer.
the officer lacked authority to stop him.
however, found that to be irrelevant.

kl at 228,
Id.

kl

Benefiel argued that

953 P.2d at 978. The supreme court,

Because the stop was supported by

reasonable suspicion, and therefore met constitutional standards, there was no violation
of Benefiel's constitutional rights and therefore no suppression.

kl at 229,

953 P.2d at

979.
The analysis in Moore and Benefiel applies here. In order for a search warrant to
be valid, it must be supported by probable cause to believe that evidence or fruits of a
crime may be found in a particular place. State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93,
852 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1993).

There is no dispute in this case that the search

warrant was based upon probable cause. Thus, in this case the search warrant was
constitutionally reasonable regardless of whether there was compliance with I.C.R.
41 (a). Benefiel, 131 Idaho at 229, 953 P.2d at 979. As in Moore, the state law did not
alter the constitutional standard of reasonableness.
As shown above, Branigh was not entitled to suppression for a violation of a state
law, and there was no constitutional violation because the search warrant was
supported by probable cause. Thus, the district court's denial of Branigh's motion to
suppress (presented as a motion in limine; see R., pp.306-307) was correct, although
on different grounds, and should be upheld on this alternative basis. State v. Stewart,
149 Idaho 383, 234 P.3d 707, 712 (2010) (affirming denial of motion on correct theory,
one not reached by trial court); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144,
149 (1999) (if trial court reaches the correct result by incorrect theory, appellate court
will affirm upon the correct theory).
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D.

The Search Warrant Description Of The Premises Met The Particularity
Requirement For A Search Warrant
Two search warrants were served by fax on Sprint Nextel; the first search

warrant obtained "printouts of all incoming and outgoing text messages," and "the call
detail records to include all incoming and outgoing calls" for Branigh's cell phone
number "for the period of 09-01-2007 until 10-02-07." (R., vol. II, p.320.) The second
search warrant obtained the subscriber information, and a certification/authentication
letter on all the records provided (by both search warrants) in regard to Branigh's cell
phone during the same time frame. (Vol. II, R. p.331.) Both search warrants listed the
premises to be served as follows:
Sprint Nextel Corporate Security, Subpoena Compliance, located at 6480
Sprint Parkway in Overland Park, Texas (Fax #913-315-0736).
(R., vol. II, pp.320, 331.)
One of the suppression grounds cited by Branigh was that the search warrant for
his cell phone records incorrectly listed the place to be searched as located in Overland
Park, Texas, instead of Overland Park, Kansas. (R., vol. II, pp.306-307, 316; Vol. VI,
R., pp.1195-1203.) Although the district court initially issued an order granting Branigh's
motion to bar the admission of his cell phone records on the basis of I.C.R. 41(a), that
order took judicial notice that the area code listed for the fax number of the Sprint Nextel
office in Overland Park, Texas, "includes Overland Park, Kansas." (R., vol. IV, p.755
n.2.)

After the state filed a motion for reconsideration, the court denied Branigh's

suppression motion on the basis that 18 U.S.C. § 2703 permitted the magistrate to
issue a search warrant for cell phone records stored or held by an out-of-state cell
phone provider.

(Tr. p.231, Ls.10-25.)

During trial, Branigh again objected to the
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admission of his cell phone records, which the court overruled on the same grounds
upon which it previously denied his motion in limine. (R., vol. IV, p.801, L.6 - p.802,
L.12; p.832, Ls.17-22.)

On appeal, Branigh argues that, "[b]ecause the warrants

described the premises to be searched as being in Texas, and the warrants were
served in Kansas, they were unlawfully executed." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Branigh's
argument is not compelling.
"Both the federal constitution and the constitution of Idaho mandate particularity
in the description of the place to be searched." State v. Schanefelt, 115 Idaho 129, 130,
765 P.2d 154, 155 (Ct. App. 1988). The purpose of the particularity requirement is to
minimize the risk that officers will search in a place other than that intended by the judge
who issued the warrant.
The applicable test for determining the sufficient degree of particularity is
whether "the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort
ascertain and identify the place intended." This Court has expanded on
this test: "The description must be sufficiently clear so that the property to
be searched is recognizable from other neighboring properties."
State v. Carlson, 101 Idaho 598, 599, 618 P.2d 776, 777 (1980) (citations omitted). The
warrant is to be interpreted in a commonsense and realistic fashion." State v. Sapp,
110 Idaho 153, 155, 715 P.2d 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1986). "Defects or omissions that do
not affect the likelihood of an erroneous search are to be ignored." State v. O'Keefe,
143 Idaho 278, 286, 141 P.3d 1147, 1155 (Ct. App. 2006).
In its initial order granting Branigh's motion in limine to suppress his cell phone
records, the district court took judicial notice that the area code listed in the search
warrants (913) included Overland Park, Kansas, and, inferentially, not Texas. (R., vol.
IV, p.755, n.2.) Therefore, since the correct state was readily ascertainable from the
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face of the search warrants themselves, they met the particularity requirement.

In

contrast, in State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 653, 534 P.2d 771, 773 (1975), the Idaho
Supreme Court directed the trial court to enter an order granting suppression because,
U[i]n the facts at bar the only distinguishable description contained in the warrant and
supporting affidavit was the house number[,]" and the record was "uncontradicted that
the number was incorrect."

Several cases subsequent to Yoder establish that an

erroneous address is not fatal if there is an otherwise adequate description of the place
to be searched. State v. Hart, 100 Idaho 137, 594 P.2d 647 (1979) (wrong number in
address did not invalidate warrant); State v. Carlson, 101 Idaho 598, 618 P.2d 776
(1980) (misnaming of road did not invalidate warrant); Schanefelt, 115 Idaho 129, 765
P.2d 154 (numerically incorrect address did not invalidate warrant); Huck v. State, 124
Idaho 155, 857 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1993) (wrong road name did not invalidate warrant);
see also State v. Young, 136 Idaho 711, 39 P.3d 651 (Ct. App. 2002) (search warrant
upheld despite incorrect physical description of premises where address was correct
and executing officer had knowledge of location from prior visits). As the district court
appears to have found, the area code of the fax address for Sprint Nextel established
the premises described with such particularity that it could be distinguished from other
properties despite the mistaken "Texas" reference.
Moreover, because the search warrants issued were for Branigh's cell phone
records and were served on his cell phone provider, Sprint Nextel, by fax, there was no
chance that the mistake of naming Texas as the state where the premises were located
could result in a search of the wrong premises. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho at 286, 141 P.3d at
1155. The search warrants sought specialized information from Branigh's cell phone
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provider, and any other entity (or person) receiving such a request would not - and
could not - have complied. Moreover, by serving the search warrants by fax instead of
in-person, there was no way the error in Sprint Nextel's physical address could have
affected the accuracy of service of the search warrants to Sprint Nextel's fax number.
There was simply no likelihood of an erroneous search.

Branigh has failed to

demonstrate that the defect in the search warrants affected "the likelihood of an
erroneous search[,]" and should not be ignored. O'Keefe, 143 Idaho at 286, 141 P.3d at
1155; Schaffer, 112 Idaho at 1027, 739 P.2d at 326.
E.

The District Court Correctly Determined That The Search Warrant For SprintNextel Text Messages Was Valid Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703
After the district court initially granted Branigh's motion in limine to exclude text

messages obtained by a search warrant served on Sprint-Nextel at an out-of-state
(Kansas) electronic information storage facility (Vol. IV, Tr., pp.752-757), the prosecutor
filed a motion for reconsideration with a supporting brief (id., pp.763-771).

Upon

reviewing the authority presented - namely, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), part of the Stored
Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.) - the court reversed its decision and
ruled that the issuance and execution of the search warrant for Branigh's cell phone
records was valid under the federal statute, and, contingent upon the state laying a
proper foundation, the phone records would be admitted at trial. (Tr., vol. 1, p.229, L.16
- p.231, L.25.) Branigh claims on appeal that "the district court erred by concluding that
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) expanded the authority of an Idaho court to issue a warrant beyond
that which is provided by Idaho lawL]" and that I.C.R. 41 (a) precludes Idaho
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magistrate's from exercising jurisdiction outside Idaho.11 (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-32.)
Branigh's argument falls short.
In In the Matter of the Search of Yahoo, Inc., 2007 WL 1539971 *3 (D. Ariz.
2007), the federal district court explained the status of 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) in 2007, the
time relevant to Branigh's case:
Section 220 of the USA Patriot Act, entitled "Nationwide Service of
Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence," amended § 2703(a) so it now
provides that:
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service of the contents
of a wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic
storage in an electronic communications system for one
hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant
issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the
offense under investigation or equivalent State warrant.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added), as amended by PL 107-56
(HR 3162),2001.
(Underscore added.) Apart from generally requiring phone service providers to disclose
the contents of stored electronic communications if served with a timely and appropriate
warrant, there are four significant aspects to the amended version of 18 U.S.C. §
2703(a).

First, the title of the amendment makes it clear that the statute relates to

"nationwide service" of search warrants for electronic evidence, not simply for service of
such warrants within a court's own territorial area of jurisdiction.

Second, "[a]

governmental entity" encompasses both state and federal governmental entities. Third,
11 I.C.R. 41(a) reads:
(a) Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule
may be issued by a district judge or magistrate within the judicial district
wherein the property or person sought is located upon request of a law
enforcement officer or any attorney for the state of Idaho.
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by permitting "a court with jurisdiction over the offense under investigation" to issue a
search warrant for stored electronic communications, the statute indicates that it is
authorizing the service of such search warrants in extra-jurisdictional locales. Fourth,
search warrants for extra-jurisdictional locations can be state warrants, as long as they
are equivalent to warrants obtained under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Branigh's complaint that the federal statute cannot increase the jurisdiction of an
Idaho magistrate (see I.C.R. 41 (a)) is misplaced. It is the federal statute -- not an Idaho
magistrate -- that legally obligates out-of-state service providers to disclose stored
electronic data to state law enforcement officers named in state search warrants
(equivalent to warrants under the federal rules). The state search warrant is not, by
itself, legally binding; instead, it triggers compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
Arguments analogous to Branigh's have been repeatedly made, unsuccessfully, with
regard to Federal Criminal Rule 41 (b ).12 As explained in the recent decision of United
States v. McVicker, 2012 OS 860412 *2, n.1 (D. Or. 2012):
Several courts have interpreted § 2703(a) as authorizing a federal court in
the district where an alleged crime occurred to issue warrants to seize
electronically stored communications located in other districts. They have
contrasted this authority with the different and distinct authority under Rule
41(b) for federal courts to issue warrants for the search and seizure of
evidence located within their districts. See, e.g., United States v. Berkos,
546 F.3d 392, 397-98 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Kemell, 2010 WL
1408437, *4 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2010), report and recommendation
adopted by 2010 WL 1491861, *3-5 (Apr. 13, 2010); In re Search of
Yahoo, Inc., 2007 WL 1539971 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007); In re Search
Warrant, 2005 WL 3844032, *5-6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2006). Thus
Congress - and the courts, in interpreting congressional intent - has
distinguished between courts with territorial jurisdiction over an alleged
crime and courts with the authority under Rule 41 (b) to issue warrants for
12 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (b) states, "a magistrate judge with authority in
the district ... has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or
property located within the district."
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searches to be conducted within their districts. This distinction refutes Mr.
McVicker's argument that a court must have territorial jurisdiction before it
can issue a search warrant under Rule 41.
Further, in Hubbardv. MySpace, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 319, 325-326 (S.D. N.Y.
2011) (footnotes omitted), the federal district court explained that, under 18 U.S.C. §
2703(a), not only are federal magistrate judges permitted to issue out-of-district search
warrants, but state warrants also fall under the provisions of that statute, stating:
Congress made clear that, in adopting the relevant statutory
language, it specifically intended to allow federal courts to authorize
searches beyond their normal jurisdiction: ....
Thus, even though federal magistrate judges typically may issue
warrants only for searches within their districts, extraterritorial warrants are
permissible for purposes of Section 2703(a).
Plaintiff concedes as much. He nevertheless contends that state as opposed to federal- warrants do not satisfy Section 2703(a) where the
issuing court exceeds its ordinary territorial authority.
The Court
disagrees.
If federal warrants satisfy Section 2703(a) in these
circumstances, the same ought to be true of equivalent state warrants ...

It bears clarifying that Section 2703(a) does not impermissibly
expand the power of Georgia magistrates or any other courts.
The above authorities support the view that, regardless of territorial jurisdiction by
either a state or federal magistrate (or judge), "extraterritorial warrants are permissible
for purposes of Section 2703(a)." lQ" In addition, the state relies upon the state's Brief
in Support of State's Motion for Reconsideration (Vol. IV, Tr., pp.765-771), attached as
Appendix A, and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.

Branigh has failed to

demonstrate any error in the district court's decision denying his motion in limine to
suppress the phone records obtained through the search warrant served on SprintNextel.
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F.

The District Court's Denial Of Branigh's Suppression Motion Should Also Be
Affirmed On The Basis That Branigh Lacked Standing To Challenge The Search
Of His Out-Of-State Stored Records Of His Cell Phone
In its brief in support of its motion for reconsideration of the district court's initial

decision to suppress Branigh's out-of-state cell phone records, the state argued that
Branigh lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in those records because, like
letters, after his text messages were opened or received, he lost any expectation of
privacy he might have otherwise had. (R., vol. IV, pp.3-6.) The district court disagreed,
relying in part on Quon v. Arch Wireless Operation Company, 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir.
2007). (Tr., vol. 1, p.229, L.16 - p.231, L.1.) However, Quon was later reversed and
remanded by the United States Supreme Court in City of Ontario, California v. Quon,
_

U.S. _ _ , 130 S.Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010), in which the Supreme Court specifically

stated it was not deciding, only assuming for present purposes, that "Quon had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to
him by the City[.]"
Although the district court's decision to deny Branigh's motion to suppress his
cell phone records was not based upon a finding that Branigh lacked standing under the
Fourth Amendment to challenge the search, its denial order should be upheld on that
basis. See State v. White, 102 Idaho 924, 925,644 P.2d 318, 319 (1982) ("This Court
has held that where a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the reason given by the trial
court for admitting the evidence may have been incorrect."); State v. Morris, 119 Idaho
448,450,807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the lower court's
ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any theory). Inasmuch as the
"standing" issue has been adequately briefed below, the state relies on the Brief in
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Support of State's Motion for Reconsideration (Vol. IV, Tr., pp.765-771), attached as
Appendix A, and incorporated as if fully set forth herein, for its argument that the district
court's order denying Branigh's motion to suppress his out-of-state cell phone records
obtained pursuant to a search warrant should be affirmed on the ground that Branigh
has no standing to mount such a challenge under the Fourth Amendment.

II.
Branigh Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Admission
Of State's Exhibits 32, 33, and 34
A.

Introduction
Branigh asserts the district court erred "by admitting State's Exhibits 32, 33, and

34 because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.,,13 (Appellant's Brief, p.32.) He claims the exhibits had little relevance and
the only effect they would have had "was to appeal to the jury's passion by creating
sympathy for Mr. Johnston because of the state he was in when the photographs were
taken." (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) Branigh's arguments are without merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other questions of admissibility

of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,
264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3
(1997).

In reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, an appellate court

determines whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the

13 The photographs were taken in the St. Joseph's Hospital Emergency Room in
Lewiston. (Tr., vol. 1, p.645, L.1 - p.647, L.7.) State's Exhibit 32 depicts a wound to
Mike Johnston's right shoulder, State's Exhibit 33 shows a chest wound, and State's
Exhibit's 34 is a photo of the chest drainage tube. (Id.)
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exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices it had; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37,43
P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 876 P.2d
587,589 (1994)).
C.

Branigh Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Admitting The Three Photographs
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that

is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." !.R.E. 401. Unless otherwise excluded by the
Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is admissible. I.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if
it is necessary to tell the complete story of the circumstances of a crime. State v. Izatt,
96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975); State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 1719,878 P.2d 188, 191-193 (Ct. App. 1994).
Branigh does not appear to contend that the three photographs have no
relevance.

Indeed, the photos are relevant to show the nature and extent of Mike

Johnston's injuries and to corroborate and illustrate the emergency room physician's
testimony, making it easier for the jury to understand his observations and conclusions.
See State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 402, 958 P.2d 22, 28 (Ct. App. 1998); State v.
Peters, 116 Idaho 851, 853-854, 780 P.2d 602, 604-605 (Ct. App. 1989). Dr. Hunter
testified that State's Exhibits 32 and 33 accurately showed Mike Johnston's wounds
when he was brought to the emergency room, and State's Exhibit 34 was an accurate
photograph of the chest drainage tube he inserted into Mike Johnston that evening.
(Tr., vol. 1, p.646, L.15 - p.647, L.7.) The three photographs helped Dr. Hunter explain
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to the jury, through visual means, the condition Mike Johnston was in after he arrived at
the emergency room, and how Dr. Hunter unsuccessfully attempted to save his life.
(Tr., vol. 1,648, L.4 - p.651, LA.)
Instead of arguing that the three exhibits had no relevance, Branigh argues that
because he did not contest the fact that Mike Johnston bled to death due to a gunshot
wound, the three photos had such little relevance, they should not have been admitted.
He states:
However, any relevance to these exhibits was extremely low. There was
no dispute in this case that Mr. Johnston was shot in the chest and there
was no dispute that the wounds caused his death. The coroner testified,
without objection, to those conclusions. The only contested issue in this
case was whether Mr. Branigh was the shooter. These photographs
contribute nothing to this issue. The photographs, of bloody bullet wounds
and a chest tube full of blood, were unfairly prejudicial because they had
no effect other to [sic] appeal to the jury's sympathy.
(Appellant's Brief, p.33. 14 ) Branigh's argument has no basis in law. That a defendant is
"not disputing" certain facts does not make those facts or evidence establishing them
irrelevant. The state bore the burden of proving this crime. Although Branigh does not
dispute that the person examined by Dr. Hunter in the emergency room was Mike
Johnston, and that the injuries Dr. Hunter observed caused Mike Johnston's death,
those were facts relevant to the determination of this case, whether "disputed" or not. A
defendant cannot prevent the state from proving its case by evidence even with a
stipulation. State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 86-87, 253 P.3d 754, 760-761 (Ct.App. 2011).

Branigh offers no showing from the record that the facts demonstrated by the
evidence at issue were "undisputed." The defense offered no stipulations to those facts.
Branigh's argument is apparently that, because he offered no evidence to refute the
state's evidence, the state's evidence was undisputed and therefore irrelevant.
14
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Branigh's argument that the evidence was rendered "irrelevant" because it went to
"undisputed" facts is without merit.
Branigh next argues that, although the district court "appears to have perceived
the issue as one of discretion, ... [it] failed to reach its conclusion through an exercise
of reason." (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) However, the district court did exercise reason, as
evidenced by its determination that, under I.RE. 403, although the photos had "some
prejudicial impact, ... the probative value [was] sufficient" to admit them into evidence.
(Tr., vol. 1, p.647, Ls.21-25.) The district court necessarily exercised reason in reaching
its determination that, although the three photos had some prejudicial impact, their
probative value was still sufficient, under Rule 403, to admit them.

The court's

comments showed it engaged in the weighing process required by I.RE. 403 to
determine whether the probative value of the evidence was "substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice [etc.]." I.RE. 403.
Finally, Branigh alleges, "[t]he only effect the photographs would have had was to
appeal to the jury's passion by creating sympathy for Mike Johnston because of the
state he was in when the photographs were taken." (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) Although
State's Exhibits 32 and 33 show bullet wounds to Mike Johnston's body, they are not so
intensely graphic that they would have caused a juror to decide the case based on an
emotional response to them. The fact that photographs depict the body of a victim and
the wounds inflicted on the victim and may tend to excite the emotions of the jury does
not mandate their exclusion from evidence. State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 853, 828
P.2d 879, 882 (1992); Hawkins, 131 Idaho at 402, 958 P.2d at 28.

Rather, the trial

court must exercise its discretion by balancing the probative value of possibly
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inflammatory evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice. Winn, 121 Idaho at 853, 828
P.2d at 882. Although the district court did not specifically describe how graphic and
emotionally upsetting State's Exhibits 32, 33, and 34 appeared to be, a review of those
photographs does not reveal anything that would evoke more than a normal emotional
response to photographs of a body with bullet wounds, or a chest drainage tube. It is
apparent the district court was conscious of the danger of unfair prejudice posed by the
nature of the photographs, but, after weighing that danger against the probative value of
the evidence, appropriately admitted them to assist the physician's testimony. There
was no abuse of discretion.

III.
Branigh Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Admission Of His Text
Messages Into Evidence
A.

Introduction
Branigh contends the district court erred by admitting cell phone records (State's

Exhibits 4 and 64) of his text messages without first determining, under I.R.E. 404(b)
and the two-tiered analysis of State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009),
whether (1) the text messages "occurred, and that the defendant was the actor," and (2)
the "danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the
evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.35-36.)
Branigh has failed to show any error in the district court's admission of State's
Exhibits 4 and 64 because: (1) he failed to point out any particular text messages that
were subject to Rule 404(b), (2) the question of whether the text messages were real
acts committed by Branigh was not placed squarely before the district court, therefore it
was not required to make specific findings on the issue, (3) the district court did, in fact,
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determine that, under !.R.E. 403, the text messages' probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading the
jury, and (4) even if the district court erred in admitting State's Exhibits 4 and 64, such
error was harmless. 15
B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209,218,245 P.3d 961,970 (2010) (citations omitted).
C.

Factual Background On Admission Of State's Exhibits 4 And 64
Prior to trial, Branigh filed a second motion in limine, in which he sought a ruling

to preclude the prosecutor from referring to any past crimes, wrongs, or acts unless the
trial court gave permission, outside the jury's presence, to do so. (R., vol. III, pp.531532.) The motion made no mention of any specific evidence. (ld.) During a pre-trial
motions hearing, both parties agreed to the proposed procedure without identifying any
specific evidence that might fall under Rule 404(b). (Tr., vol. 1, p.182, L.2-p.183, L.1.)
During trial, the state moved to admit State's Exhibit 4, text messages on Desiree
Anderson's cell phone, and Branigh objected on several grounds, explaining in part,
"[s]ome of these are 404(b) and also Rule 403, the probative value of these far out
weigh [sic] -- is far out weighed [sic] by prejudicial value. Every one of these messages
is different, Your Honor."

(Tr., vol. 1, p.512, Ls.3-9.)

The court initially sustained

Branigh's objection on foundational grounds (Tr., vol. 1, p.512, Ls.10-13), but after
Inasmuch as Branigh's argument that State's Exhibits 4 and 64 were not admissible
under Rule 404(b) is solely based on the assertion that the district court failed to
conduct the two-tier analysis required by Grist, the state will not address whether the
two exhibits otherwise met the requirements for admission under Rule 404(b).
15
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Desiree Anderson provided more information about the text messages, the court
admitted the exhibit (Tr., vol. 1, p.514, L.17 - p.515, L.19), explaining:
As to the Rule 403 objection that the probative value is out weighed
[sic] by the prejudicial impact, I'm going to overrule the Rule 403 objection.
I've also not been cited anything particular for 404(b) nature, so that
objection is also overruled. And Exhibit 4 will be admitted at this time.
(Tr., vol. 1, p.515, Ls.17-19.)
In regard to State's Exhibit 64, Ryan Harger, a custodian of records and
supervisor of electronic surveillance with Sprint Nextel, testified that it was comprised of
text messages stored on Branigh's cell phone account over a twelve-day period, which
he provided to the Lewiston Police Department pursuant to a search warrant. (Tr., vol.
1, p.788, L.19 - p.797, L.10.) The text messages cover the period from September 20,
2007, through October 2, 2007.

(St. Ex. 64.) After the prosecutor moved to admit

State's Exhibit 64, Branigh objected on the basis of I.R.E. 403 and 404(b), contending,
inter alia, "that the prejudicial value far outweighs the probative value, Your Honor."
(Tr., vol. 1, p.803, L.19 - p. 804, L.18.) The district court admitted State's Exhibit 64
into evidence, ruling:
Well, I'm going to overrule the objection first of all on the grounds
previously raised and I'll also overrule the objection pursuant to Rule 403.
I don't believe that [sic] probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusing or misleading the jury. And I'm also
going to overrule the objection under Rule 404(b) and State's Exhibit 64 is
admitted.
(Tr., vol. 1, p.804, Ls.19-25.)
D.

The District Court Correctly Denied Branigh's Rule 404(b) Objection To His Text
Messages Because He Failed To Specify Which Messages Fell Under The Rule
Branigh failed to advise the district court which text messages in State's Exhibits

4 and 64 were subject to Rule 404(b), nor has he done so on appeal. (See Appellant's
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Brief, pp.35-37.)

State's Exhibit 4 contains 68 pages of photographs of 68 text

messages from Branigh to Desiree Anderson, taken from her cell phone, which were
received on September 22, 2007, and October 1, 2007.

(See generally St. Ex. 4.)

State's Exhibit 64 is Branigh's cell phone records, including numerous text messages
between Branigh, Mike Johnston, and Desiree Anderson, which occurred from
September 20, 2007, through October 2, 2007. (See generally St. Ex. 64.)
The admission of State's Exhibits 4 and 64 should be upheld on the ground that
Branigh failed to identify which text messages fell under Rule 404(b). Without knowing
which specific text messages were allegedly subject to Rule 404(b), the district court
simply could not have determined whether a text message was within the scope of Rule
404(b), was relevant for any of the purposes allowed under the rule, and, if within the
scope of the rule and relevant, whether the probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, the district court correctly
overruled Branigh's objections to the admission of State's Exhibits 4 and 64 because
the court had "not been cited anything particular for 404(b) nature.,,16 (Tr., vol. 1, p.515,
Ls.17-19.)

16 Although the district court did not expressly make the same determination in regard
to State's Exhibit 64, because Branigh also failed to advise the court which particular
text messages in that exhibit were subject to Rule 404(b), the decision to admit them
into evidence should be upheld. See State v. White, 102 Idaho 924,925,644 P.2d 318,
319 (1982) ("This Court has held that where a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the
reason given by the trial court for admitting the evidence may have been incorrect.");
State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448,450,807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate
review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any
theory).
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E.

Because The Question Of Whether The Text Messages Were Actual Acts
Committed By Branigh Was Not Placed Squarely Before The District Court,
Branigh Has Failed To Show Error In Any Lack Of Specific Findings On The
Issue
Branigh contends the district court failed to comply with the first tier analysis

required by Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185, by determining whether the text
messages "occurred, and that the defendant was the actor." (Appellant's Brief, pp.3536.) However, under State v. Cooke, 149 Idaho 233, 239-240, 233 P.3d 164, 170-171
(Ct. App. 2010), because Branigh failed to squarely present that issue before the district
court, the court was not required to make such specific finding.
In Cooke, the Idaho Court of Appeals considered essentially the same argument
Branigh advances.

Cooke, 149 Idaho at 238-242, 233 P.3d at 169-173. The Court

explained that, "[i]n [State v.] Parmer, [147 Idaho 210,207 P.3d 186 Ct. App. 2009)], we
interpreted the Idaho Supreme Court opinion in Grist to require that in determining
I.R.E. 404(b) relevancy a trial court must articulate a separate finding that sufficient

evidence exists to support a reasonable conclusion that the other crime, wrong, or act
occurred."

.!s!:.,

149 Idaho at 239, 233 P.3d at 170. However, "[a]bsent the issue being

brought to the district court's attention" there is "no need for the district court to
specifically articulate its determination on the record."

.!s!:.,

149 Idaho at 240, 233 P.3d at

171.
Similar to the "threats" at issue under Rule 404(b) in Cooke, Branigh did not
object to the admission of State's Exhibits 4 and 64 on the basis that the text messages
were not shown to have been made by him. (See Tr., vol. 1, p.514 L.19 - p.515, L.21;
p.803, L.19 - p.804, L.25.) Because "Parmer's 'specific articulation' requirement only
applies when the record on appeal shows the issue was squarely before the trial
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court[,]" Cooke, 149 Idaho at 240, 233 P.3d at 171, the district court in Branigh's case
was not obligated to make specific findings about the first tier analysis of Grist.
Moreover, as stated in Cooke, even though the district court did not articulate the
first tier analysis required by Grist, there was "substantial and competent evidence to
support a finding that there was sufficient evidence by which a jury could reasonably
conclude [Branigh] made the [text messages]." Cooke, 149 Idaho 240, 233 P.3d at 172.
The foundation laid for the admission of State's Exhibits 4 (by Desiree Anderson) and
64 (by Ryan Harger) provided "substantial and competent evidence to support the lower
court's unarticulated finding" that the text messages actually occurred, and that Branigh
made them.

kL

(see Tr., vol. 1, p.510, L.2 - p.514, L.16; p.788, L.19 - p.797, L.12;

p.902, L.19 - p.803, L.1; State's Exhibits 4,64).
F.

Branigh Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Determination
That The Probative Value Of State's Exhibits 4 And 64 Was Not Substantially
Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice
Contrary to Branigh's argument, the district court did, in fact, determine that,

under I.R.E. 403, the probative value of the text messages of both State's Exhibits 4
and 64 was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or
misleading the jury.

(See Appellant's Brief, pp.35-37.)

Branigh's assertion that the

district court failed to analyze whether the "danger of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the evidence" (Appellant's Brief, p.36) is plainly
disproven by the record.
As noted, when the district court admitted State's Exhibit 4, it stated:
As to the Rule 403 objection that the probative value is out weighed
[sic] by the prejudicial impact, I'm going to overrule the Rule 403 objection.
I've also not been cited anything particular for 404(b) nature, so that
objection is also overruled. And Exhibit 4 will be admitted at this time.

35

(Tr., vol. 1, p.515, Ls.17-19.) Likewise, in making its determination that State's Exhibit
64 would be admitted, the district court stated:
Well, I'm going to overrule the objection first of all on the grounds
previously raised and I'll also overrule the objection pursuant to Rule 403.
I don't believe that probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusing, or misleading the jury. And I'm also
going to overrule the objection under Rule 404(b) and State's Exhibit 64 is
admitted.
(Tr., vol. 1, p.804, Ls.19-25.)

The record shows the district court conducted a 403

balancing analysis before admitting State's Exhibits 4 and 64.
Nothing in the Grist opinion mandates the conclusion, suggested by Branigh, that
a trial court errs as a matter of law by failing to articulate the bases of a Rule 403
determination on the record. In this case, the district court admitted the state's proffered
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and, in so doing, specifically stated that its probative value was
not outweighed by its potential prejudice. That the court did not expressly say what the
evidence was relevant to prove or what its potential prejudice was does not show error.
G.

Even If The District Court Erred In Its Evidentiary Rulings. Such Error Is
Harmless
Even were this Court to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

not performing the proper Rule 403 balancing test, any such abuse would constitute
harmless error. Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. "The
inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the
defendant] even without the admission of the challenged evidence." State v. Johnson,
148 Idaho 664,669,227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18,24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999».
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Even if the district court erred in permitting the introduction of State's Exhibits 4
and 64, such error is harmless because State's Exhibits 60 and 61 were also admitted
at trial. State's Exhibit 60 is a compilation from Sprint Nextel records of text messages
between Branigh and Mike Johnston from September 30, 2007 until moments before
Johnston was shot on October 1, 2007. State's Exhibit 61 is a compilation from Sprint
Nextel records of text messages between Branigh and Desiree Anderson from 5:00
a.m. until 10:09 p.m. on October 1,2007, just before the shooting occurred. (Tr., vol. 1,
p.825, L.20 - p.832, ,L.23; St. Exs. 60, 61.)
The text messages reveal that Branigh was becoming increasingly angry and
demanding because Desiree Anderson had ended their relationship in favor of seeing
Mike Johnston. In his text messages to Desiree Anderson, Branigh insisted she meet
with him to talk, spoke of his willingness to sacrifice himself; stated that he did not care
about "dead bodies in old graves," said death was an honor, and texted that "mks done
u wont talk 2 me, so I swear it on ur kids' lives, mks done[.]" (St. Ex. 61.) Branigh's text
messages to Mike Johnston were increasingly insulting and threatening, culminating
with him calling Mike a coward and challenging Mike to meet him by texting "come on"
and "u comin" shortly before Mike was murdered.

(State's Exhibit 60, pp.9-11.)

State's Exhibits 60 and 61 reflect Branigh's increasing animus toward Mike
Johnston for winning the affections of Desiree Anderson.

Additionally, the text

messages provided the jury with a time trail showing Branigh was meeting Mike
Johnston to engage in some type of altercation just prior to Mike Johnston's murder.
(See St. Ex. 60.) There is nothing in State's Exhibits 4 and 64 that could be deemed
harmful to Branigh's case beyond the incriminating nature of the evidence presented in
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his text messages from State's Exhibits 60 and 61. That information, either alone or in
combination with the other testimony and evidence presented at trial, as set forth in the
Statement of Facts, supra, demonstrates that any error in the admission of State's
Exhibits 4 and 64 was harmless because this Court can say, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that absent the error, the outcome of Branigh's jury trial would not have been
different. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669, 227 P.3d at 923; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

IV.
Branigh Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His Unpreserved
Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
During trial, Lewiston Police Officer Brian Birdsell testified that Branigh, his car,

and his glasses, were not subjected to gun powder residue collection or testing because
the state lab does not test gun powder residue. (Tr., vol. 1, p.780, L.20 - p. 781, L.24.)
Additionally, Detective Larry Stuck testified that, on the night of the murder, he went to
the hospital and examined the gunshot wounds on Mike Johnston's body. (Tr., vol. 2,
p.953, L.22 - p.954, L.4.) Detective Stuck, who had had some training in recognizing
gun powder burns or residue, but was not a GSR expert, testified that he observed gun
powder residue on one of the wounds. (Tr., vol. 2, p.953, L.22 - p.974, L.12.) When
Branigh asked what it meant "if gun powder residue is attached to a wound?", Detective
Stuck stated:
Well, it can mean several things based on my training and
experience. ... My observations in this report are cursory observations
and initial observations. Basically there may be a blackening around the
wound or what they call tattooing where the gun powder will be embedded
into the skin.
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(Tr., vol. 2, p.956, L.11-16.) When Branigh asked the detective if he had any idea of
"the distance that a gun would have to be from someone to do that?", he said he did
not. (Tr., vol. 2, p.956, Ls.17-19.)
In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:
The Defendant is likely to make a big deal of the fact that there was
no gun shot residue testing done. But if you will recall, Lieutenant Birdsell
told you the Lab doesn't do those any more. In fact, the FBI doesn't do
them any more because they are not reliable. They don't tend to prove
anything. They result in false positive. If you find evidence of gun shot, all
that says is that at some time in the past there was a gun fired. You can't
identify the gun, when it was, anything like that. And so they have taken
the position they will no longer do the testing.
So the fact that there is the potential to do things, and in this case
there wasn't, but if there is a potential to do things that you might see on
CSI, you know, did we do a DNA analysis on the blood drops on the
sidewalk, no.
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1023, L.25-p.1024, L.13.)
During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor told the jury that gunshot residue
evidence would not have been helpful because Branigh had one hour and 40 minutes
from the time of the murder until the chase started in which to have washed his hands to
eliminate any trace of gunshot residue. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1039, L.19-25.) The prosecutor
further explained that gunshot residue from other sources - such as officers who helped
take Branigh into custody and who had fired shots at Branigh's tires -- could have been
found on Branigh, which would have made testing pointless as far as proving anything.
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1039, L.25 - p.1040, L.10.) The prosecutor then stated:
There is no way that we could have introduced evidence to say that
that was a result of the revolver that he used to kill Michael Johnston any
more than it was evidence that it was GSR transfer from all the - well, as
a matter of fact, I mean here's a - every officer in every car has got gun
shot residue sitting around. I mean it just becomes a mess. Everyone of
them takes qualification practice, their guns have it on them. They handle
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their guns. All of them have their guns drawn at this time. The weapons
that are in their car have gun shot residue. Its just - you know, it's just
unreliable evidence. So it would not have proven anything for the
Defendant regardless of what he says.
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1040, LS.11- 22.)
For the first time on appeal, Branigh argues that the prosecutor's closing and
rebuttal arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct and fundamental error.

He

contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts about gunshot
residue ("GSR") not in evidence.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.37-40.)

A review of the

challenged remarks shows no misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes

fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App.
2010). In the absence of an objection, "the appellate court's authority to remedy that
error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair
tribunal." Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245 P.3d at 976. Review without objection will not
lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or
obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional information" including
information "as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the
"defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights,"
generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings."

!sL at _,245 P.3d at 978.
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C.

Branigh Has Failed
Fundamental Error

To

Show

Prosecutorial

Misconduct Amounting

To

Branigh argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct rising to the level of
fundamental error by arguing during closing argument facts about gunshot residue that
were not in evidence.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.37-40.) A prosecutor has considerable

latitude in closing argument. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440
(2009); State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997); State v. Priest,
128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). He or she is entitled to argue all
reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record.

Severson, 147 Idaho at 720,

215 P.3d at 440; Porter, 130 Idaho at 786,948 P.2d at 141 (citing State v. Garcia, 100
Idaho 108, 110, 594 P.2d 146, 148 (1979)). If a prosecutor exceeds this latitude and
"attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury
instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment
right to a fair triaL" Perry, 150 Idaho at _ , 245 P.3d at 979.
Although there was no testimony upon which to base the prosecutor's comments
that the FBI no longer conducts GSR testing because such tests are not reliable (etc.)
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1024, Ls.3-9), that is not the type of information which would have injected
fundamental error into Branigh's trial by affecting the foundation of his case or depriving
him of his right to a fair trial. With or without testimony to establish that the FBI does not
conduct GSR testing because the test results are unreliable, the prosecutor was entitled
to make common sense arguments to explain why such testing can be irrelevant which was the overall point of the prosecutor's comments.
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In State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 718-720, 215 P.3d 414, 438-440 (2009),
the Idaho Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether several unobjected-to
comments by the prosecutor during closing argument in Severson's first degree murder
trial (for killing his wife, Mary) constituted fundamental error. The court found that while
the prosecutor's comment, ""[n]obody knows, that has testified, what happened between
them," "could be interpreted as a reference to Severson's failure to testify, it could also
be accorded other meanings.,,17

Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439

(emphasis original). Next, the court found that the prosecutor's "statements that Mary
was speaking from her grave were somewhat inflammatory because they were likely
designed to appeal to the sympathies and passions of the jury.18 1..9.:. Third, the court
determined that the prosecutor's comments about the victim's family arguably
improperly asked the jury to identify with the victim.19 However, the court concluded

17 More fully, the prosecutor stated:
[t]his is a circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that
night but Mary and Larry. Nobody knows, that has testified, what
happened between them."
Severson, 147 Idaho at 718,215 P.3d at 438 (emphasis original).
18 The prosecutor told the jury:
Mary still speaks to us today. She is still telling us what happened that
night and why she is dead . . .. Mary tells us, she speaks to us from her
grave as to who killed her and why she died.
Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439.
19 The comments by the prosecutor were:
Mary Severson isn't a decedent. Mary Severson was the 35-year-old
mother of two boys. Mary Severson was the daughter of Carol Diaz.
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that none of the comments by the prosecutor, individually or together, resulted in an
unfair trial or deprived Severson of his due process rights, and therefore, did not rise to
the level of fundamental error.

19.:.;

cf. State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 574-575, 181

P.3d 496, 500-501 (Ct. App. 2007) (closing argument comment that defendant told
police "I intended to do this" was prosecutorial misconduct because it mischaracterized
the testimony and went to the sole basis of the defense -- lack of intent due to severe
mental illness).
Here, as in Severson, none of the prosecutor's comments rise to the level of
fundamental error. Some or most of the prosecutor's comments about GSR are simply
common sense observations - reasonable inferences from the evidence - buttressing
the argument that, in Branigh's case, GSR testing was irrelevant because: (1) negative
test results could easily be due to Branigh washing his hands during the one hour and
40 minute opportunity he had to do so after firing the weapon, and (2) positive test
results could be explained by a variety of other sources of GSR - including transfer from
officers who had fired shots at Branigh's tires when he was taken into custody. As
Officer Stuck testified, the presence of GSR on the victim's wound can mean several
things, and the prosecutor properly further argued that the presence/absence of GSR
on Branigh could also be attributed to several things which would make testing
pointless. (Tr., vol. 2, p.956, Ls.11-12.) The prosecutor was entitled to expound, using
common sense and reasonable inferences, about how the relevance of GSR testing
was minimized by such factors. Moreover, the jury was instructed by the court that the

Mary Severson was the sister of Maria Gray. Mary Severson's life had
purpose, and it had meaning. Your duty today is to give her death justice.
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720,215 P.3d at 440.
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arguments and statements of the lawyers are not evidence, and "[i]f the facts as you
remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, follow your memory."
(R., vol. V, p.948 (lnstr. No.4).)
Branigh has failed to meet his burden of showing that the prosecutor's comments
so infected the trial as to deprive him of his due process rights. Therefore, he has failed
to meet the first requisite of Perry of showing a violation of a constitutional right. Perry,
150 Idaho at _ , 245 P.3d at 978. Accordingly, Branigh has also failed to demonstrate
that a constitutional right of his was plainly violated and that such violation was not
harmless, i.e., that this Court can find, beyond a reasonable doubt the constitutional
violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict. 150 Idaho at _ , 245 P.3d at 979-980.

V.
Branigh Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error As A Basis For Concluding The
Prosecutor Engaged In Misconduct Under Napue

A.

Introduction
Branigh claims the prosecutor "violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due

process at his trial when he knowingly failed to correct false testimony that was
tendered by Mr. Peak, who was one of the State's witnesses at trial." (Appellant's Brief,
p.42.) Branigh asserts that Peak, who testified at trial about statements Branigh made
to him while in custody together, falsely testified, and that the prosecutor knew or should
have known the testimony was false.

(ld. pp.42-43.)

Branigh specifically contends,

"[d]uring trial, when asked ... what his relationship was with former Sheriff Dorion, Mr.
Peak characterized the officer as only an acquaintance and further responded that he
only knew the former Sheriff as, "a resource officer at my high schoo!." (Appellant's
Brief, p.43.)
44

Branigh's argument alleges a due process violation by the prosecutor under
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Under Napue, the government is obligated to
correct any evidence introduced at trial that it knows to be false, regardless of whether
or not the evidence was solicited by it. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; Alcorta v. Texas, 355
U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).

Although Branigh argued in

district court that the prosecutor committed a Bradl o violation for failing to disclose
potentially eXCUlpatory information about Peak's relationship with the sheriff, he did not
raise a Napue claim that the prosecutor knowingly introduced (or failed to correct) false
testimony at trial. (See Supp. R., pp.197-209 (brief supporting motion for new trial).)
Therefore, that issue is not subject to review by this Court unless Branigh establishes
fundamental error under the three-part test of Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961. He
has failed to do so.
B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for

appeal through an objection at trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. Where
a claim is raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether
the error alleged qualifies as reviewable fundamental error.

kl at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

[I]n cases of unobjected to fundamental error: (1) the defendant must
demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional
rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without the
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected

In contrast, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), "the government may not
knowingly suppress evidence that is exculpatory or capable of impeaching government
witnesses." Phillips v. Ornoski, 673 F.3d 1168, 1188 (9th Cir. 2012) see Banks v.
Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004) (discussing Brady).
20
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the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must
have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 19.:. (footnote omitted).

19.:. (footnote omitted).
C.

Factual Background
A report by F. B.I. Special Agent Douglas Hart was admitted into evidence at

Branigh's evidentiary hearing on his motion for a new trial. (Mot. Tr., p.16, Ls.9-15;21
Supp. Exs., pp.11-13.) According to that report, about a month after Mike Johnston's
murder, Hart arranged a meeting when Lt. Charlie Spencer of the Idaho State Police
received a call from the Nez Perce County Prosecutor, Dan Spickler, inquiring about
whether the F.B.I. and I.S.P. were conducting an investigation of Nez Perce County
Sheriff Jim Dorion.

(Supp. Exs., p.11.)

Agent Hart informed Spickler that the two

agencies were at the preliminary stage of investigating Dorion, and that the existence of
their investigation needed to stay confidential.

(ld.)

During the meeting, Spickler

expressed several concerns about the sheriff:
Spickler had heard that Dorion allowed young men to use his
personal vehicles and allowed them to drive county vehicles;
a young man by the name of Stephen Peak, suspected of several
burglaries, was allegedly given access by Dorion to a law enforcement
database ("Spillman") used by the Lewiston Police Department, the Nez
Perce County Sheriff's Department, and other law enforcement agencies;
a "number of people" spoke to Spickler regarding Peak's close,
personal relationship with Dorion;
Lewiston Police Officers informed Spickler that their confidential
informants reported that Peak had access to the Spillman database, and
one report said Peak had trained a new deputy on how to use the
database; and

21 The three hearing dates for Branigh's motion for a new trial are contained in one
volume, which will be referred to as "Mot. Tr."
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Lewiston Police Officers expressed great concern to Spickler about
Peak's relationship with Dorion.
(Id., pp.12-13.) Prior to trial, Spickler had no further contact with the F.B.1. or I.S.P. in
regard to their joint investigation of Dorion, and did not disclose any of the abovedescribed information to Branigh prior to trial. 22 (Mot. Tr., pA1, L.20 - pA2, L.5; pA3,
LsA-9; pA7, Ls.6-10.)
During trial, Peak testified for the state that he had been incarcerated with
Branigh for about two weeks, and Branigh was the only person Peak "hung out with
during the time in there." (Tr., vol. 2, p.875, Ls.17-25.) Peak testified that during his
time in jail, Branigh told him or talked about:
a).

conspiracy theories about how the Lewiston Police and Desiree
Anderson were responsible for Mike Johnston's death, and Desiree
wanted to be with Branigh (Tr., vol. 2, p.876, Ls.10-22);

b).

the medical examiner incorrectly identified the entry and exit bullet
holes depicted in autopsy photos (Tr., vol. 2, p.877, L.21 - p.878,
L.11 );

c).

that autopsy photos showed that the victim "doesn't look so tough
frozen in a body bag" (Tr., vol. 2, p.879, L.20- p.880, L.1);

d).

the position the victim had to have been in when he was shot by the
shooter (Tr., vol. 2, p.880, LsA-11);

e).

the weapon "would have to be this certain type to have this same
size of exit wound as the entrance wound" (Tr., vol. 2, p.880, Ls.1922);

f).

Mike Johnston's phone was inside the house and Desiree was the
one texting Branigh when he thought he was texting with Mike
Johnston (Tr., vol. 2, p.881, Ls.16-21);

22 According to Spickler, F.B.1. Agent Hart and I.S.P. Lieutenant Spencer informed him
during their meeting that he was "was not going to be involved in the investigation, and
that they desired [him] to contact the State's AG's office to be the contact point for - for
them in relationship to the investigation [and] that they would not be contacting [him]
any further .... " (Mot. Tr., p.36, Ls.16-24; see Supp. R., p.221.)
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g).

a witness had seen Branigh's car over a fence line, but that "she
wouldn't be able to see my car from there" (Tr., vol. 2, p.881, LS.2124);

h).

Branigh talked about a gun when describing where he went that
night and said "he went up the old spiral highway around a corner is
[sic] where he buried the gun (Tr., vol. 2, p.882, Ls.6-8);

i).

when Peak said "I thought you didn't do it," Branigh smiled at Peak
and said "I didn't" (Tr., vol. 2, p.882, Ls.10-11);

j).

Branigh described his relationship with Desiree Anderson, including
the rules she made about sex; that he couldn't tell anybody and that
he couldn't leave any marks (Tr., vol. 2, p.883, Ls.6-11);

k).

Branigh talked about the places he and Desiree Anderson had sex,
how he took pictures of her, that she would tell him to leave her
alone but that she "doesn't know that she really loves him" (Tr., vol.
2, p.883, Ls.14-19);

I).

when Branigh was showing Peak pictures from his case, Branigh
talked about hearts on the steps in the tile in the bricks, said it
would be a good place to die, stated he had never seen a person's
eyes when they died, always wondered what would go through a
dying person's mind, and said he wished he would have stuck
around (Tr., vol. 2, p.885, Ls.2-9);

m).

when Branigh went through text messages exchanged between
himself and Desiree Anderson, Peak said he thought Branigh's cell
phone had been stolen and Peak smiled and said it was (Tr., vol. 2,
p.885, Ls.12-17);

n).

in regard to the police pursuit the night of the murder, Branigh said
he wanted to go to Albertson's because they have cameras there
and he felt the police were going to shoot him and he wanted there
to be evidence, then he decided that if he was going to die he was
going to die at his father's house and he wanted his father to see
him die (Tr., vol. 2, p.886, L.10 - p.887, L.4);

0).

Branigh said he had gotten high octane gas for his car because he
knew he would be in a chase so that his car would go faster (Tr.,
vol. 2, p.887, L.24 - p.888, L.2).
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D.

Branigh Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error
Because Branigh did not present his Napue issue in the district court, the state

had no notice or opportunity to contest the issue below, and the district court made no
findings of fact or rulings concerning the issue. Therefore, Branigh's argument that the
prosecutor committed a Napue violation can only be reviewed for fundamental error. 23
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
1.

Branigh Has Failed To Show A Violation Of A Constitutional Right -- Prong
One Of Perry

Branigh has failed to meet the first requirement for showing fundamental error
under Perry -- that one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated. 150
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

In Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, the Supreme Court

reiterated the well-established principle that the state cannot obtain a conviction through
the knowing presentation of false evidence, including false testimony. "The same result
obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go
uncorrected when it appears." 1.9.:. at 269 (citations omitted). ''To prevail on a Napue
claim, [Branigh] must show that '(1) the testimony (or evidence) was actually false, (2)
the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false, and
(3) ... the false testimony was materiaL"' Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 916 (9th Cir.
2006) (quoting Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9 th Cir. 2005) (en banc)).
Materiality is based upon whether there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,

23 Branigh contends that "this Court should review his claim of a due process violation
directly, as he could not have raised any objection at trial. (Appellant's Brief, p.41.)
However, Branigh could have easily presented his Napue claim along with his Brady
claim in his motion for a new trial, which was heard over two years after his conviction.
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649, 8 P.3d 636, 644 (2000) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678
(1985». '''[T]he fact that testimony is perjured is considered material unless failure to
disclose it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

kl.

Branigh cannot demonstrate that Peak's trial testimony about his relationship
with Sheriff Dorion was false, much less that the prosecutor knew about such (a"eged)
falsity at the time of trial. On appeal, Branigh asserts that, "when asked by Mr. Branigh
what his relationship was with former Sheriff Dorion, Mr. Peak characterized the officer
as only an acquaintance and further responded that he only knew the former Sheriff as[
] 'a resource officer at my high schooL'" (Appellant's Brief, p.43.) Contrary to Branigh's
assertion, Peak did not characterize his relationship with the sheriff as "only an
acquaintance." It was Branigh - not Peak -- who injected the word "acquainted" into the
record by asking Peak, "[a]re you acquainted with him?" and Peak answered "yes." (Tr.,
vol. 2, p.890, Ls.24-25.) The question by Branigh called for a "yes" or "no" answer from
Peak, and "yes" was certainly the only true response.

Moreover, Peak did not say

anything about his relationship with the sheriff as being "only" an acquaintance. It is
Branigh who, on appeal, has tacked the word "only" onto the phraseology of his own
question to Peak in order to create the tag-line that Peak testified falsely that his
relationship with the sheriff was "only as an acquaintance." Branigh's contention that
Peak testified that he was "only an acquaintance" of the sheriff is not an accurate
recitation of Peak's testimony.
Branigh similarly alleges that Peak "responded that he only knew the former
Sheriff as[ ] 'a resource officer at my high schooL'" (Appellant's Brief, p.43.) Again, the
word "only" is an appellate creation of Branigh. The record shows that after Peak was
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asked if he was acquainted with the sheriff and answered "yes," Branigh immediately
asked "[a]nd how is that?" and Peak responded "[h]e was a resource officer at my high
school." (Tr., vol. 2, p.891, Ls.1-2.) In the context of the two questions, Peak appears
to have understood Branigh as asking how he became acquainted with the sheriff, and
answered that he "was a resource officer at my high school."

Branigh's attempt to

characterize Peak's answer as a deliberate false statement by claiming Peak testified
that he "only" knew the sheriff as a resource officer is specious. 24 Peak never used the
word "only" in that discussion, was not asked if that was the "only" way he was
acquainted with the sheriff, and clearly was responding to Branigh's question of "how is
that" in regard to how he became acquainted with the sheriff.

See United States v.

Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9 th Cir. 2002) (mere inconsistencies in evidence do not
constitute knowing use of perjured testimony; it is the province of the jury to resolve
disputed testimony). Because none of the allegedly false testimony Branigh identifies
was actually provided by the witness, he has not established the first factor of the
Napue standard.
Branigh has also failed to meet the second requisite of Napue, because he
cannot demonstrate the prosecutor knew or should have known, at the time of trial, that
Peak's testimony was false. During the hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial, held
over two years after Branigh's conviction, Spickler was asked "[d]o you think" it was a
true statement for Peak to testify "he was an acquaintance" of Dorion," and answered,
"[a]s far as it went." (Mot. Tr., p.50, Ls.3-11.) When asked, "[d]o you think it was the
whole truth?" Spickler, with the benefit of two years of hindsight, said it was not. (Mot.

The last question Peak was asked by Branigh at trial was, "[b]ut you do know Jim
Dorian; correct?" and Peak answered "[y]es." (Tr., vol. 2, p.906, Ls.6-7.)

24
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Tr., p.50, Ls.12-13.) However, Spickler was not asked if he knew at the time Peak

testified if Peak's testimony was true. Moreover, as discussed, during trial Peak merely
answered "yes" to Branigh's question, "[a]re you acquainted with him?" and when
Branigh asked "[a]nd how is that?" Peak explained H[h]e was a resource officer at my
high schoo!." (Tr., vol. 2, p.890, L.24 - p.891, L.2.) Spickler was not asked to explain
what he knew about the truth or falsity of Peak's testimony at the time that testimony
was presented at trial, a necessity in establishing a Napue violation.
Lastly, Branigh cannot meet the third and final requirement of Napue by showing
there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury." Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 985 (9 th Cir. 2005); Sivak, 134
Idaho at 649, 8 P.3d at 644 (2000). Based upon the testimony and evidence presented
at trial, as set forth in the Statement of Facts, supra, even if the first two elements of a
Napue violation are met, this Court can say there is no reasonable likelihood that the
(alleged) false testimony could have affected Branigh's the judgment of the jury.
Based on the foregoing, Branigh's Napue claim is without merit. Accordingly, the
prosecutor had no duty to "correct" Peak's testimony. As to the first prong of the Perry
standard, Branigh has not established that he suffered any violation of an unwaived
constitutional right.
2.

Branigh Has Failed To Show Clear Error - Prong Two Of Perry

Branigh has also failed to show the alleged Napue violation is "clear or obvious,
without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision[.]" Perry,
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

Although Branigh implies that the record
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demonstrates a clear or obvious Napue violation (Appellant's Brief, pp.4D-42), the
record he relies upon as the basis for his argument is not extant. Branigh mistakenly
asserts that Peak "testified falsely before the jury that his relationship with ... Dorion
was one of mere acquaintance, and that he knew the officer only due to the fact that the
former Sheriff was a resource officer at Mr. Peak's high schooL" (Appellant's Brief, p.4D
(emphasis added); see id., p.43 ("Mr. Peak characterized the officer as only an
acquaintance and further responded that he only knew the former Sheriff as, 'a resource
officer at my high schooL'" (emphasis added).) Branigh's inaccurate portrayal of Peak's
trial testimony does not create the type of complete record endorsed by Perry by which
this Court can determine whether a Napue violation occurred during Branigh's trial.
The record does not show a clear or obvious Napue violation because it does not
even reveal that Peak testified falsely at trial. Additionally, the record is insufficient to
establish what the prosecutor knew or should have known at the time of trial about the
truthfulness of Peak's trial testimony. The prosecutor was never asked that question at
the hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial. Moreover, neither the Napue issue nor
its blatant implication -- that the prosecutor knowingly elicited or allowed false testimony
at trial -- were raised by Branigh, contested by the parties, or considered and ruled upon
by the district court. Because these issues were not raised below, this Court cannot
merely assume that all evidence necessary for their resolution is in the record.
Inasmuch as Branigh has failed to show a Napue violation is clear or obvious
from the record, he has failed to meet the second requirement for showing fundamental
error under Perry.
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3.

Branigh Has Failed To Show A Reasonable Probability That The Error
Affected The Outcome Of The Trial- Prong Three Of Perry

Even assuming a violation of one of his unwaived constitutional rights is clear
and obvious from the record, Branigh has failed to meet the third prong of Perry by
showing "a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings."

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

The state relies upon its

Statement of Facts, supra, to show that even if the first two prongs for showing
fundamental error under Perry are met, this Court can say there is no reasonable
probability that the (alleged) false testimony could have affected the outcome of
Branigh's trial.
Branigh has failed to demonstrate any of the three elements required under Perry
for showing fundamental error. Therefore, his Napue claim cannot be reviewed.

VI.
Branigh Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His Brady Claim

A.

Introduction
Branigh's motion for a new trial was based on two grounds, the first of which was

his allegation that the prosecutor committed a BradyZ5 violation by withholding
potentially exculpatory (or impeaching) information about Stephen Peak's close
relationship with Sheriff Dorion and reports that Peak had been allowed access to the
Spillman law enforcement database. 26 (Supp. R., pp.197-209.) The district court first
held that the prosecutor withheld information required to be disclosed under Brady, and

25 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
26 Branigh's second ground for a new trial more generally asserted that Peak's
relationship with the sheriff was newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial under
I.C. § 19-2406(7). (Supp. R., pp.197-209.)
54

characterized such withholding as a Brady violation. (Supp. R., pp.467-482.) The court
explained:
By the time the Branigh trial commenced, the prosecutor knew the
relationship between Peak and Dorion was such that Peak could have
accessed confidential police information through Spillman or from Dorion.
At the very least, the prosecutor had direct information from law
enforcement officers regarding the Peak/Dorion relationship and knew an
investigation was being conducted by the FBI, Idaho State Police and the
Lewiston City Police Department.
Therefore, the findings of that
investigation were available to the prosecutor had he made inquiry, an
inquiry he was obligated to make once he decided to call Stephen Pak as
a witness in light of the potential Brady nature of the Peak/Dorion
relationship.
(Supp. R., p.476. 27 ) However, the court then determined that such a violation did not
playa material role in Branigh's conviction, and denied his Brady-based motion for a
new trial. (Id.)

27 The district court incorrectly stated that the Lewiston City Police Department was one
of the agencies investigating Peak's relationship with Sheriff Dorion - only the FBI and
the Idaho State Police were involved in that investigation. (Supp. R., p.19 ("the FBI and
ISP were conducting an investigation of Nez Perce County Sheriff Jim Dorion"), p.221 (
the FBI and ISP advised Spickler "that an investigation of Dorion had been opened by
[the] two agencies.") It should also be recalled that, according to Spickler, FBI Agent
Hart and ISP Lieutenant Spencer informed him during their meeting that he "was not
going to be involved in the investigation, and that they desired [him] to contact the
State's AG's office to be the contact point for - for them in relationship to the
investigation [and] that they would not be contacting [him] any further .... " (Mot. Tr.,
p.36, Ls.16-24; see Supp. R., p.221.) Prior to trial, Spickler had no further contact with
the F.B.I. or I.S.P. in regard to their joint investigation of Dorion, and did not disclose
any of the above-described information to Branigh prior to trial. (Mot. Tr., p.41, L.20 p.42, L.5; p.43, Ls.4-9; p.47, Ls.6-10.)

Even though the prosecutor knew about the joint investigation by the FBI and
ISP, contrary to the district court's conclusion, he had no duty to inquire or investigate
further into their investigation in order to disclose updated information therefrom. The
duty to produce material exculpatory information encompasses the duty to investigate
"any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (emphasis added).
Because the FBI and ISP were not involved in the Branigh prosecution, they were not
"acting on the government's behalf in the case," id.; therefore, the prosecutor had no
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Branigh argues that "the district court erred when it denied his motion for a new
trial based upon the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory impeachment
evidence." (Appellant's Brief, ppA7-48.). Branigh specifically contends (1) inasmuch as
the district court found all the elements of a Brady violation were met, it "erroneously
determined that he was not entitled to a new trial based upon its conclusion that the
remaining evidence - aside from the testimony of Mr. Peak - was sufficient to convict
Mr. Branigh[,]" and (2) the "sufficient evidence" holding "is clearly inconsistent with
controlling case law from the United States Supreme Court." (ld., pA8.)
The district court's denial of Branigh's Brady claim was correct, although for more
than the reasons expressed by the court. In ostensibly finding "materiality" under Brady,
the court did not apply the correct legal standard.

However, wren next determining

whether the alleged Brady violation warranted a motion for a new trial under the
materiality and prejudice elements of State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d
972, 978 (1976),28 the court applied the standard for materiality under Brady, and
concluded that Branigh had failed to meet it.

Because the district court found that

Branigh failed to meet the materiality test required by Brady, its finding that there was a
Brady violation is incorrect.

Therefore, the district court's denial of Branigh's Brady

claim was correct and must be upheld, although on different grounds.

obligation to follow up on the findings of their investigation. See United States v.
Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (no duty to learn information possessed by
governmental agencies with no involvement in investigation). Thus, the only information
withheld was the fact of the investigation, not the evidence or conclusions uncovered by
the investigation. The district court's conclusion otherwise is clearly erroneous.
28 Under Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978, the requirements for granting a
motion for a new trial are: (1) the evidence is newly discovered and was unknown to
the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or
impeaching; (3) it will probably produce an acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the
evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of

deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135
Idaho 712,720,23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).
C.

Standards Of Law Applicable To Brady Claims
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the prosecution is required to

disclose to the defense all eXCUlpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession.
The duty to disclose includes impeachment evidence.

United States v. Bagley, 473

U.S. 667, 676 (1985). "[T]he Constitution is not violated every time the government fails
or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the defense." Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995).

Rather, "suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to an accused ... violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution."

1st at 432

(quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). Evidence is "material" "if there

is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Kyles,
514 U.S. at 433.
To prove a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) that the evidence was
eXCUlpatory or impeaching; (2) it should have been but was not produced; and (3) the
suppressed evidence was material to his guilt or punishment. Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). According to the Supreme Court, "the materiality inquiry is not
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just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light
of the undisclosed evidence, the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury's
conclusions.

Rather, the question is whether 'the favorable evidence could reasonably

be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in
the verdict.'"
D.

19.:. at 290 (citations omitted).

The District Court's Factual Findings Show That The Evidence Was Not Material
Although the district court ostensibly concluded that all three elements needed to

establish a Brady violation had been met (Supp. R., p.475-477), review of the court's
opinion reveals that the "materiality" standard it applied in regard to third Brady element
was not the materiality element actually required by Brady.
As noted, the test for materiality under Brady is whether "there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Kyles, 514 U.S. at
433. A "reasonable probability" of a different result is shown when the withholding of
information "undermines confidence in the outcome of the tria!." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434;
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678.

However, the district court applied a different standard for

materiality in its Brady determination, to wit:
Finally, there can be little doubt that Branigh was prejudiced by the
withholding of evidence that carried such palpable impeachment value.
Peak was called as a witness by the State, speaking to the significance
the prosecutor placed upon his testimony. The logical next step the
prosecutor should have made was to recognize that evidence of Peak's
opportunity to obtain information from a source other than Branigh was
material and opened the door for impeachment, thus requiring disclosure.
Yet, Branigh was denied the evidence, evidence that fell squarely within
Brady disclosure requirements, was specifically requested, and was within
the knowledge of the prosecutor.
(Supp. R., p.476.)
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In the ensuing part of the district court's opinion discussing the elements required
for obtaining a new trial, the court made it clear that its earlier Brady materiality
determination was based upon finding the withheld information was relevant for
impeachment purposes - not how the withheld information may have impacted the
results of the trial. The court explained:
As noted by the Court above, the withheld evidence was relevant to the
credibility of Peak's testimony and clearly had substantial impeachment
value. However, Defendant Branigh failed to show that the evidence
regarding the relationship between Peak and Dorion was material to the
State's case against Branigh, or that it was material for more than its
impeachment value.
(Supp. R., pp.477-478.)
The district court's ruling that Branigh met Brady's materiality requirement was
not based on the correct legal standard. When the court talked about "materiality" in the
context of the Brady claim, it meant something akin to "relevance to impeachment value
or purposes" -- not the overarching questions of whether, had information not been
withheld, there is a reasonable probability of a different result of the trial, or whether
confidence in the results of the trial has been undermined. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433434; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682,678.
In considering Branigh's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence, however, the district court found that Branigh failed to demonstrate materiality
under the exact standard required for Brady claims?9 A review of the record shows
that, contrary to Branigh's argument, the district court did not apply a materiality

29 Although the second and third requirements for granting a motion for a new trial
under Drapeau (i.e., (2) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching,
and (3) it will probably produce an acquittal) are equivalent to the "reasonable
probability" materiality standard of Brady, the district court actually adopted the precise
phraseology of the Brady standard.
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standard based on "sufficiency of the evidence" or even I.C. § 19-2406 and Drapeau
(see Appellant's Brief, pp.50-51), rather, it applied the same standard required by
Brady.
After finding a Brady violation, the district court's opinion next concluded that, in
the purported application of the Drapeau requirements for granting motions for a new
trial, the non-disclosure of the information about Peak was not material.

Most

significantly, the court used the Brady standard for materiality in making its
determination that Branigh did not meet the materiality element of Drapeau. Under the
heading of "Motion for New Trial," the district court set forth the materiality standards for
Brady violations (without specific mention of Brady, but in regard to non-disclosure of
evidence), including (1) showing a "reasonable probability . . . the result of the
proceedings would have been different," citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, and (2) that a
"reasonable probability" (etc.) is one where the "government's evidentiary suppression
'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial,'" citing id., 514 U.S. at 434. (Supp.
R., p.477.) When it began to render its decision on the motion for a new trial, the court

adopted the afore-mentioned standards of Brady-based materiality, specifically ruling:
Finally, Defendant Branigh has failed to show that, had the withheld
evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability of a different
result. ... However, it is not probable that it would have produced a
different result given the significant amount of evidence presented to the
jury that had no relationship to Peak or the statements alleged by Peak to
have been made by Branigh.
(Supp. R., p.478 (emphasis added).)

The court then outlined the untainted and

"significant amount of evidence" presented to the jury showing Branigh's guilt (Supp.
Tr., pp.478-480), and at the end of its opinion stated:
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When the testimony of Stephen Peak is set aside, the remaining evidence
presented by the State was more than sufficient for the jury to have
reached a verdict of guilty.
Therefore, while the Court finds the
withholding of impeachment evidence a violation of Brady and its progeny,
the Court is unable to find the evidence would have likely resulted in an
acquittal had the evidence been disclosed prior to trial.
(Supp. R, pp.480-481 (emphasis added).)
Branigh filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's denial of his
motion for a new trial (Supp. R, pp.483-484), which the district court denied (id"
pp.517-520).

The court explained that the sole basis of Branigh's motion was his

assertion that the court applied an incorrect analysis in denying his motion for a new
trial because it allegedly "failed to apply the 'reasonable probability' standard that the
newly discovered evidence would have changed the outcome of the jury's verdict,
instead wrongly applying the standard that the newly discovered evidence would have
probably produced an acquittal." (Supp. R, p.519.) The court responded:
The Court respectfully disagrees with Defendant Branigh's reading of the
Court's Opinion. The Court addressed the newly discovered evidence
utilizing the 'reasonable probability' standard, as is clearly noted at page
12 of the Court's opinion. The Court, after careful review and as stated in
its earlier opinion, remains of the opinion that if the testimony of Stephen
Peak was completely removed from the record, the remaining evidence is
clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict. In other words, the withheld
evidence cannot be found to undermine confidence in the verdict.
(Id. (emphasis added).)
On appeal, Branigh asserts that the district court should have applied the
standard for materiality under Brady,30 but did not, and focuses on the one comment the

30 Branigh contends the district court improperly used the materiality standard
applicable to I.C. § 19-2406 instead of the Brady standard. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5051.) However, his argument centers on the comment by the district court that the
evidence presented by the state "was more than sufficient" to convict Branigh even
without the testimony of Peak, which is not the same standard as Drapeau's second
61

district court made at the end of its initial decision denying his motion for a new trial; that
the remaining evidence presented by the state "was more than sufficient for the jury to
have reached a verdict of guilty." (Appellant's Brief, pp.48-51.)
Branigh's argument is oblivious to the record. The district court not only prefaced
its ruling on Branigh's motion for a new trial by citing the materiality standards of Brady
as stated in Kyles and Bagley, it adopted that standard when it began rendering its
decision. (Supp. Tr., pp.477-478 ("Branigh has failed to show that, had the withheld
evidence been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability of a different result.")
Although the district court used the "more than sufficient" language Branigh now asserts
was the basis of its opinion, after Branigh asked the court to reconsider its decision on
that ground, the court made it clear it had applied the "reasonable probability" standard
at page 12 of its initial opinion, and added it was also finding that "the withheld evidence
cannot be found to undermine confidence in the verdictL]" which two statements
comprise the precise standards for materiality under Brady. (Supp. R., p.519.)
Branigh side-steps the two Brady-materiality renditions in the court's order
denying his motion for reconsideration, and instead states, "the district court denied this
motion by reiterating that the court remained, 'of the opinion that if the testimony of
Stephen Peak was completely removed from the record, the remaining evidence is
clearly sufficient to support the jury's verdict.'" (Appellant's Brief, p.52; Supp. R., p.519.)
However, when read in context (see above), the district court did not base its decision
on a "sufficiency" standard of materiality.

Its "sufficiency" comment was sandwiched

between the two materiality statements from Kyles and Bagley (i.e., "reasonable
and third requirements that the evidence be material, and that it will probably produce
an acquittal. Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, 551 P.2d at 978.
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probability" (etc.) and "undermine confidence" (etc.)) that apply to Brady claims. (Supp.
R., p.519.)

Notably, the court concluded, "[i]n other words, the withheld evidence

cannot be found to undermine confidence in the verdict[,]" one last assurance by the
court that it was applying the Brady materiality standard.
Because the district court applied the same materiality standard that is required
by Brady when its analyzed materiality under Drapeau, and because the court held that
Branigh failed to meet that standard of materiality, the court necessarily found that no
Brady violation occurred. There can be no Brady violation unless all three elements
have been met. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82 (1999) ("There are three components of a
true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either
because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have
ensued.") Therefore, the district court's denial of Branigh's Brady claim was correct and
must be upheld. See White, 102 Idaho at 925, 644 P.2d at 319 ("This Court has held
that where a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the reason given by the trial court for
admitting the evidence may have been incorrect. "); Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807 P.2d
at 1288 (on appellate review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of
being upheld on any theory).
Finally, the state relies upon its Statement of Facts, supra, which is based on the
testimony presented during trial, to show that Branigh has failed to, and cannot,
demonstrate materiality with regard to his Brady claim. The state also relies upon the
district court's determination that the testimony of Peak added little to the state's case,
explaining in its opinion denying Branigh's motion for a new trial:
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The testimony provided by Peak at trial was of minimal value as Peak
testified Branigh at all times denied shooting Johnston. Rather, Peak's
testimony consisted of Peak inferring guilt based on Branigh's alleged
comments regarding certain pieces of evidence and his asserted
statement that he buried a gun in a particular location, though no gun was
found despite an extensive police search of the area.
When the
testimony of Stephen Peak is set aside, the remaining evidence presented
by the State was more than sufficient for the jury to have reached a verdict
of guilty. Therefore ... the Court is unable to find the evidence would
have likely resulted in an acquittal had the evidence been disclosed prior
to trial.
(Supp. R., pp.480-481.)

Finally, as the district court noted, (1) Branigh made some

admissions that he had discussed with Peak some of the subjects Peak testified about
at trial, and (2) none of the significant information Peak testified about at trial could have
been obtained through the Spillman database:
At the hearing on the Motion for New trial [sic], a March 2008 letter
from Branigh to a Lewiston Police Department Detective, admitted as
State's Exhibit 2, confirmed that Branigh had told Peak some of what Peak
claimed he had learned from Branigh. [Mot. Tr., p.120, L.14 - p.122, L.22]
In addition, the Detective testified he had reviewed the Branigh case
information maintained in Spillman, and it was his finding that none of the
information testified to by Peak at trial was in the Spillman data base at
the time Peak is believed to have had access to the system. [Mot. Tr.,
p.107, L.5-p.114, L.13)
(Supp. R., p.478, n.8.)
In sum, the district court correctly determined that Branigh failed to demonstrate
either that Peak's testimony, or the withholding of information about Peak's relationship
with the sheriff, played a material role in Branigh's conviction for first degree murder.
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VII.
Branigh Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error As A Basis For Concluding The
District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For A New Trial

A.

Introduction
After the jury found Branigh guilty of first degree murder with a firearm

enhancement (R., vol. V, pp.941-942), he filed a motion for a new trial.
pp.984-988; 1088-1089.)

(R., vol. V,

By the time of the hearing on his motion, there were two

bases for the motion, the second of which was his claim that newly discovered evidence
of Peak's relationship with the sheriff justified a new trial under I. C. § 19-2406(7).31
(Supp. R., pp.197-209.) The district court denied Branigh's motion for a new trial on the
second basis by relying on the materiality test of Brady, even though it also quoted and
cited the Drapeau test as appropriate to such a motion. 32 (Supp. R., pp.477-481.) On
appeal, Branigh argues for the first time that Peak's testimony at the hearing on his
motion for a new trial constitutes a "recantation" of his prior testimony, and therefore
warranted the lesser materiality standard of State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716
P.2d 1152 (1985) -- showing a different result of the trial is "possible" -- should be
applied instead of Drapeau's "probable" standard. (Appellant's Brief, pp.52-57.)
Despite Branigh's argument, the question of whether Peak's testimony at the
hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial constitutes a recantation of his trial testimony
was not raised or litigated in the district court, and there is no factual finding or adverse
ruling from which to appeal. Therefore, that issue is not subject to review by this Court

31 As discussed, the first basis was that the prosecutor allegedly violated Brady by
withholding information about Peak's relationship with the sheriff.
32 Because the two standards for materiality are essentially the same, the court's
reliance on the Brady standard instead of, or in combination with, the Drapeau standard
is not significant, nor has Branigh argued otherwise.
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unless Branigh establishes fundamental error under the three-part test of Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961. Branigh has failed to do so.
B.

Standard Of Review
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's discretion

and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. State v. Jones,
127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley, 119 Idaho 62, 63, 803
P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991).
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for
appeal through an objection at trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. Where
a claim is raised for the first time on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether
the error alleged qualifies as reviewable fundamental error.

.!st. at 226,245 P.3d

at 978.

To demonstrate fundamental error, a defendant must show: (1) a violation of an
unwaived constitutional right, (2) clear or obvious error, "without the need for any'
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision," and (3) "the error affected the
defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected
the outcome of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226,245 P.3d at 978.
C.

Branigh Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error
Branigh did not present to the district court the issue of whether Peak's testimony

at the hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial constituted a recantation of his trial
testimony that, in turn, required "possibility of a different result" materiality standard of
Scroggins. (See R., vol. V, pp.984-988, 1088-1089 (motions for new trial); Supp. R.,
pp.197-209 (brief in support of motion for new trial); Mot. Tr., pp.131-147 (closing
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arguments at hearing on motion for new trial.) The state, therefore, had no notice or
opportunity to contest the issue below, and the district court made no findings of fact or
rulings concerning the issue.
As explained in Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P .3d at 980, "[i]f the alleged error
was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only be reviewed by an
appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine."

Because Branigh never

argued to the district court that Peak's motion hearing testimony constituted a
recantation of his trial testimony and that the Scroggins materiality standard applied to
Branigh's motion for a new trial, nor objected to the district court's ruling on that basis,
he cannot present his issue on appeal.

kL.

Therefore, Branigh's recantation/Scroggins

issue can only be reviewed for fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at
978. Branigh has failed to meet the three-prong test for such error under Perry.
1.

Branigh Has Failed To Show A Violation Of A Constitutional Right -- Prong
One Of Perry

Branigh has failed to meet the first requirement for showing fundamental error
under Perry -- that one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

Branigh's argument that, because Peak

allegedly recanted his trial testimony, the district court erred by not applying the
Scroggins standard of materiality in determining his motion for a new trial under I.C. §
19-2406(7), does not even allege a violation of Branigh's constitutional rights.

(See

Appellant's Brief, pp.52-57.) Therefore, Branigh's recantation/Scroggins claim cannot
be reviewed.
Even if reviewed, Branigh has failed to show Peak's trial testimony was false and
that he recanted his testimony at the motion hearing. Therefore, the district court did
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not abuse its discretion by not adopting the materiality standard provided by Scroggins.
In State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 72, 253 P.3d 727, 746 (2011) (emphasis original),
the Idaho Supreme Court explained that in Scroggins it stated, '''where a defendant
submits an affidavit by a government witness in which the witness recants his testimony

and specifies in what ways he dishonestly testified and in what ways he would, if given
the opportunity to testify again, change that testimony and where a defendant makes a
showing that such changed testimony may be material to a finding of his guilt or
innocence, a new trial should be held.'"

The court then applied a three-part test for

motions for new trial based on recanted trial testimony: (1) whether the testimony by a
material witness was false, (2) whether the jury might have reached a different
conclusion without the recanted testimony, and (3) whether "the party seeking the new
trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet
it, or, did not know it was false until after the trial." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 72-73, 253
P.3d at 745-747. This test applies "where a government witness specifically identified
that he had perjured himself on the stand, and further expressly recanted his testimony."

kL 151 Idaho at 73, 253 P.3d at 747. It does not apply to inadvertent inaccurate
statements by witnesses. State v. Barlow, 113 Idaho 573, 578, 746 P.2d 1032, 1037
(1987). Branigh cannot demonstrate, as Scroggins and Ellington require, that (1) Peak
testified falsely during trial, or (2) Peak recanted his trial testimony when he testified at
the hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial.
Branigh asserts, "[a]t trial, Mr. Peak classified his relationship with the former
Sheriff as mere acquaintances who were only known to one another through the fact
that Mr. Dorion was a resource officer at Mr. Peak's school." (Appellant's Brief, p.55
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(emphasis added).)

Obviously, if Peak had testified at trial as Branigh asserts on

appeal, that he and the sheriff were mere acquaintances who were only known to one
another through the fact that the sheriff was a resource officer at Peak's high school, the
testimony would have been false.

(Appellant's Brief, p.55.)

However, Branigh's

rendition of Peak's testimony is divorced from what the record reveals. The state has
previously shown that Peak did not testify falsely at trial, and relies on that argument,
presented in section V, supra, for part of its argument in response to Branigh's claim.
However, it should be recalled that, during Peak's trial testimony, it was Branigh who
asked Peak if he was acquainted with the sheriff, to which Peak simply and truthfully
responded "yes."

(Tr., vol. 2, p.890, Ls.24-25.)

When Branigh immediately asked,

"[a]nd how is that?", a question that can reasonably be understood as inquiring how
Peak became acquainted with the sheriff, Peak explained, "[h]e was a resource school
officer at my high school" (id., p.891, Ls.1-2).

Peak did not use the words "mere" or

"only" (or any other words of limitation), during his trial testimony to make it seem as if
he was a "mere" acquaintance of the sheriff, or that he "only" knew the sheriff from the
sheriff having been a school resource officer. In fact, later during trial, Peak answered
Branigh's question, U[b]ut you do know Jim Dorian [sic]; correct?," by saying "yes." (Tr.,
vol. 2, p.906, Ls.6-7.) Branigh has failed to show that Peak's trial testimony was false.
Next, Branigh has failed to show Peak recanted his trial testimony during the
hearing on Branigh's motion for a new trial.

When Peak testified at that hearing,

Branigh's counsel tried to re-cast what Peak's trial testimony had been. However, as
shown by the following colloquy, Peak did not agree that his trial testimony had been
false, nor did he recant his prior testimony:
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Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

What was your relationship with Jim Dorian back in 2007, 2008?
I don't know really how to describe it, I guess friends.
Were you more than acquaintances?
Yes.
Do you remember testifying at the - Leotis' trial that you were
acquaintances?
I don't remember, no.
That wouldn't be the whole truth, would it?
I would say that the things we talked about were more than what
you would talk to a normal acquaintance, yeah.
So describe what your relationship with Jim Dorian was? [sic]
It was on more of a personal level, we'd talk about crimes I had
committed, my past, that sort of stuff.

(Mot. Tr., p.80, L.16 - p.81, L.g.) The comment by Branigh's attorney, "[t]hat wouldn't
be the whole truth, would it?" mischaracterized Peak's trial testimony to the extent it
implied (1) Peak had been asked by Branigh at trial whether he and the sheriff were
more than mere acquaintances, and (2) Peak had testified that being "acquainted" with
the sheriff was the full extent of their relationship. Neither contention, if intended, was
accurate.
Peak did not agree with Branigh's attorney's characterization of his trial testimony
-- nor did he recant it. Peak did not testify at the motion hearing that his trial testimony
had been false. Instead, he said he and the sheriff talked about things that "were more
than what you would talk to a normal acquaintance, yeah." (Id.) By saying, "yeah,"
Peak indicated there was more to his relationship with the sheriff than being only
acquaintances. However, at trial, Branigh was not asked if, and did not claim, he was
"only" an acquaintance of the sheriff - regardless of Branigh's repeated suggestions
otherwise. Peak's testimony, similar to Ellington, does not provide "a situation where a
government witness specifically identified that he had perjured himself on the stand, and
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further expressly recanted his testimony." Ellington, 151 Idaho at 73, 253 P.3d at 747.
This case does not involve a recantation by a material factual witness.
In sum, Branigh's has failed to show a violation, much less a constitutional
violation, by the district court's alleged failure to apply the lesser materiality standard of
Scroggins to his motion for a new trial inasmuch as he has failed to demonstrate Peak's
trial testimony was false, and that Peak's motion hearing testimony constituted a
recantation of his trial testimony.33
2.

Branigh Has Failed To Show Clear Error - Prong Two Of Perry

Branigh has also failed to show the alleged violation of failing to apply the
Scroggins materiality standard because Peak (allegedly) recanted his trial testimony is
"clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the
appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision[.]" Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. As noted, Branigh's claim does
not even allege a violation of a constitutional right; rather, he alleges a violation of I. C. §
19-2406(7) and the appellate court created rule in Scroggins of the standard to be
applied to a motion for a new trial based on recanted trial testimony.
Because Branigh did not raise his recantation/Scroggins issue in the district
court, there are no factual findings by that court, nor is there any evidentiary
development of the issue - much less a ruling employing the elements required to show
that Peak's trial testimony was false, and that his hearing testimony constituted a
recantation of his trial testimony under Scroggins. Branigh has failed to demonstrate,

33 Branigh has not challenged the district court's application of either the Drapeau or
Brady standards in denying his motion for a new trial under I.C. § 19-2406(7). (See
Appellant's Brief, pp.52-57.)
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as he must under Perry, that the record shows a clear and obvious constitutional
violation.
3.

Branigh Has Failed To Show A Reasonable Probability That The Error
Affected The Outcome Of His Motion For A New Trial - Prong Three Of
Perry

Inasmuch as Branigh has failed to show any constitutional violation, much less
that a constitutional violation that is clear and obvious from the record, there can be on
prejudice caused by the district court alleged failure to adopt the Scroggins materiality
standard in deciding Branigh's motion for a new trial. Even assuming a constitutional
violation is clear and obvious from the record, Branigh has failed to meet the third prong
of Perry by showing "a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the
trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. In the context of Branigh's
motion for a new trial, a different outcome means that Branigh must show a reasonable
probability that, absent the alleged violation, Branigh's motion for a new trial would have
been granted.
The state again relies upon its Statement of Facts, supra, to show that even if the
first two prongs for showing fundamental error under Perry are met, this Court can say
there is no reasonable probability that the district court alleged failure to apply the
Scroggins materiality standard to Branigh's motion for a new trial could have affected
the outcome of Branigh's trial.
Branigh has failed to demonstrate any of the three elements required under Perry
for showing fundamental error. Therefore, his recantation/Scroggins issue cannot be
reviewed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Branigh's conviction.
DATED this yth day of December, 2012.

~~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this yth day of December, 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS & SARAH E TOMPKINS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDERS
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
Post Office Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 799-3073
Idaho State Bar No. 2923

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAH0 1 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)

CASE NO. CR2007-0008107

)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

)

LEOTIS B. BRANIGH III,
Defendant.

)
)

COMES NOW, DANIEL L. SPICKLER, Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County,
Idaho, in the above-entitled matter and hereby respectfully submits the following Brief in
Support of State's Motion for Reconsideration regarding Text Messages obtained from
Defendant's Electronic Communications Service Provider
The State apologizes to the Court for failing to timely provide specific references to
the State's authority to issue

a Search Warrant for stored wire and electronic

communications and transactional records and to have said Warrant served extraterritorially.

1. AUTHORITY FOR EXTRA-TERRITORIAL SERVICE OF WARRANT
Authority for both Federal and State Courts to issue extra-territorial search
warrants is provided by 18 U.S.c. 2701 et. seq. (the Electronic Communication Privacy
Act).

The USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-56) broadened the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
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2703 to include stored wire and electronic communications. Definitions applicable to the
ECPA are adopted from 18 U.S.C. 2510.
Section 220 of the USA Patriot Act is entitled "Nationwide Service of Warrants for
Electronic Evidence", and modified the provisions of the ECPA.
As

stated

in

Commentary,

Chapter

121,

Stored

Wire

and

Electronic

Communications and Transactional Records Access, National Institute for Trial Advocacy,
James A. Adams (2008):
Authorization
for
obtaining
the
contents
of
stored
communications depends on two variables - the type of facility
controlling the storage and the duration of the storage. To gain
access to the content of materials stored in an "Electronic
Communications System n (defined in 18 U.S.c. 2510 (14» that
have been stored for 180 days or less, the government can
require disclosure only by resorting to a Fourth Amendment
search warrant.
The search warrant issuance process was
amended to permit issuance by any judge having jurisdiction
over the offense (emphasis added) regardless of the locus of
the electronic storage system. Thus, such warrants are valid
nationwide regardless of where they are issued.
The relevant statute, Title 18 U.S.c. 2703 (a), provides in pertinent part that:
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider
of electronic communications service of the contents of a wire
or electronic communication that is in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedures by a court with jurisdiction over the offense under
investigation or equivalent state warrant.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not apply to state judges or state law
enforcement.
probable cause.

The State must only comply with Fourth Amendment requirements of

United States v.

Kato~

(2004, CAlO Utah) 379 F.3d 1203, cert denied

(2005 US) 200S US Lexis 1888; U.S. v. McKeever, (1990, CAS Tex) 905 F.2d 829; U.S. v.

Piver, (1990, CA9 OR) 899 F.2d 881.
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A rather complete discussion of the reasoning behind the Federal Legislation is
given In the Matter of the Search of, Yahoo, Incorporated, 701 First Avenue, Sunnyvale,
California 94089, (2007 US Dist , Ariz):
Common sense dictates the result reached herein. Judicial and
prosecutorial efficiency is better served by permitting the
federal district court for the district where the crime allegedly
occurred to preside over both the investigation and prosecution
of that crime. Commentators have suggested that one reason
for the amendments effected by Section 220 of the Patriot Act
was to alleviate the burden placed on federal district courts in
the Eastern District of Virginia and the Northern District of
California where major internet service providers (tlISPs") AOL
and Yahoo, respectively, are located. See, Paul K. Ohm, Parallel
Effect Statutes [*12) and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the
Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1599, 161315 (Aug. 2004); Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through
Cyber/aw's Lens, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1375, 1454 (Aug. 2004)
(stating that the "effect of the change was to shift the
responsibility for issuance of the order from the court where the
service provider is located to the court with jurisdiction over the
offense being investigated; prior to passage of the USA Patriot
Act, a disproportionate number of such orders were issued in
the Eastern District of Virginia, where AOL is located.");
Franklin E. Fink, The Name Behind the Screenname: Handling
Information Requests Relating to Electronic Communications,
19 No. 11 Computer & Internet Law 1, 6-7 (Nov. 2002) (stating
that n[t]his provision was intended to relieve the burden on
district courts in which major communications providers are
located, such as the Northern District of California and Eastern
District of Virginia. If). Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee's
Report accompanying the USA Patriot Act explains that §
2703(a) "attempts to address the investigative detays caused
by the croSS-jurisdictional nature of the Internet." Paul K. Ohm,
Parallel Effect Statutes and E-mail "Warrants": Reframing the
Internet Surveillance Debate, 72 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. at 1614-15,
n. 80 (Aug. 2004) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 107-236, pt. 1 at 57
(2001». The Committee's Report further explains that requiring
an investigator to coordinate with agents, prosecutors, and
judges in the district where the ISP is located would cause time
delays that "could be devastating to an investigation, especially
where additional criminal or terrorists acts are planned." Id.
(emphasis added). Additionally, requiring an Arizona federal
agent investigating a crime committed in Arizona to travel to
California or Virginia to obtain an out-of-district search warrant
from a California or Virginia magistrate judge for electronicallyBRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S
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stored communications would, in my view,
increase the cost of federal investigations.

unnecessarily

2. 18 U.S.C. 2703(a) is applicable to the States.
Lest there be any confusion about the referenced statute's applicability to the
states, the Court's opinion in Ameritech v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
5941 discusses the issue regarding applicability of the ECPA to the states (in the context
of 18 USC 2706, which deals with the requirement that governmental entities are
responsible for reasonable costs incurred by the service provider):
"A governmental entity" is considerably broader than "the
federal government." The point of § 2706 is not to distinguish
the federal government from other governments, but to
distinguish the public from the private sector. Any private actor
who wants information from a phone company will have to
negotiate and pay for the service, when §2702 allows disclosure
at all. Governments have a power of compulsion, and §2706
attaches a price tag to the use of that power, just as the
Constitution's takings clause requires compensation for other
uses of governmental power to obtain private property.
Although the Electronic Communications Privacy Act does not
define the term "governmental entity, n it uses that phrase in
several sections in ways that make application to state and local
governments unmistakable. For example, §2703 specifies how a
"governmental entity" can go about obliging a phone company to
hand over records. The statute gives examples, such as "an
administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal or State statute
or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena" I
§2703(b)(1)(B)(i). Other options include a "State warrant"
(referred to in three subsections) and a "Federal or State grand
jury or trial subpoena" (in § 2703(c)(2». Then there is §
2703(d), which distinguishes what Ita State governmental
authority" must do from how a federal governmental body
proceeds, an odd reference indeed if the category "governmental
entity" does not include states.
The language of § 2703 and § 2706 taken together is enough to
satisfy any plain-statement requirement for application of federal
law to the states. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61,
115 L. Ed. 2d 410, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). Although the
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Congressional Budget Office expressed an opinion that the 1986
law would not impose new costs on states, this view--on which
Congress did not vote, and the President did not sign--cannot
alter the meaning of enacted statutes. It suggests instead that
the CBO erred (or perhaps thought that compensable demands
would be so rare that the expenses under § 2706 would not
make a dent in a governmental budget).
Next in line is the District Attorney's argument that § 2706 does
not preempt state law. It does not contain an express
declaration of preemption, the District Attorney observes, and
therefore (he says) does not supersede state law. Since when
has such a declaration been required? The Constitution's
supremacy clause does all the heavy lifting. Federal statutes
prevail over state and local statutes to the extent of any
inconsistency, whether or not Congress so declares one statute
at a time. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 489, 93 l. Ed. 2d 883, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).

3. Defendant lacks standing to raise constitutional violation issues.
In addition to the grounds asserted above, the State contends the Defendant is
without standing to contest the State's obtaining records belonging to Sprint/Nextel. The
records may be about the Defendant, but they do not belong to him.
The Court, in Albert Terrill Jones v. United States of America, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31892, observed:
"A person has an expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment if he has a subjective expectation of privacy, and if
society is prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively
reasonable." United States v. Mira valles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1331
(11th Cir. 2002) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 l. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). An individual's right to privacy is limited however.
"[T)he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed."
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 1624,
48 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1976) (limited by statute).
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We have not addressed previously the existence of a legitimate
expectation of privacy in text messages or e-mails. Those
circuits that have addressed the question have compared e-mails
with letters sent by postal mail. Although letters are protected
by the Fourth Amendment, "if a letter is sent to another, the
sender's expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon
delivery." United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir.
1996)(citations omitted). Similarly, an individual sending an email loses "a legitimate expectation of privacy in an e-mail that
had already reached its recipient." Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325,
333 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190
(2d Clr. 2004). See also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,
418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) ("Drawing from these parallels, we can say
that the transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable
expectation that police officials will not intercept the
transmission without probable cause and a search warrant.
However, once the transmissions are received by another
person, the transmitter no longer controls its destiny. "), cited in
Guest, 255 F.3d at 333.

CONCLUSION
Since this Court has already determined the search warrant was properly issued
upon probable cause, and that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of First Degree
Murder committed in Nez Perce County I Idaho, for the reasons and on the grounds
disclosed above, the State respectfully requests this Court to Reconsider its decision
regarding the admissibility of Defendant's text messages and deny Defendant's Motion in
Limine.
DATED this

.

I'd

ex - day of December 2008.
Prosecuting Attorney
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AFFIDAVU OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was
(1)

hand delivered, or

(2)

hand delivered via court basket, or

(3)
(4)

../ sent via facsimile, or
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United
States Mail.

ADDRESSED TO TH E FOLLOWING:
Charles E. Kovis
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 9292
Moscow, ID 83843

DATED this

rJ

~ day of December 2008.

MATO
. Legal Assistant
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